not

Roubini-Bremmer: A G-Zero World
Brian Holmes
Tue, 08 Mar 2011 19:00:18 -0800

< barak> zaujimave.. z kosiara sucasnej geopolitiky.. aj ad arab spring..
01:53 < barak> tvrdia ze ziadna velmoc sa nechce uchopit role globalneho policajta lebo je dost bizi sama so sebou, co globalizacia standardizovala sa zacne pomaly rozpadat, a staty zacnu viac chranit vlastne trhy protekcionizmom

/ !!!! “global public goods” (mostly security, a sordid boon) !!!???
/ spinava dobrocinnost (OLPC?), alebo co tym mysli?

Ian Bremmer and Nouriel Roubini
/ 8 ben IV sc & 4 men V ar 59

Last month we had a strong debate on Nettime about the nature and
meaning of the Arab Spring. The nature of it is up to the participants
to say, but in my view the fall of authoritarian regimes in North Africa
represents at least a partial collapse of one of the pillars on which
the transnational state-form of the present was founded, way back in the
late seventies-early eighties when Trilaterlaism (or “Triad Power”)
first got off the ground, on the backs of workers in the Arab world, in
Latin America, and then increasingly in China. Now the rise of the BRIC
countries and the development of the Gulf has entirely overtaken that
old hegemony.

In this paper by Nouriel Roubini and his wunderkind sidekick Ian
Bremmer, the ineffectiveness of the present G-20 becomes the signal of
chaos in the world system. Far from an abstract fancy hatched among the
students of Immanuel Wallerstein, world hegemony is a da‎ily concern of
the corporate classes because of its provision of so-called “global
public goods” (mostly security, a sordid boon). Roubini and Bremmer
don’t see anyone delivering the goods in the near future.

I’m sending the article because it nails the central point on which my
analysis of the Arab Spring is based: the collapse of the Trilateral
system that was perfectly represented by the members of the G-7.
However, the paper was written before the events in Egypt and anyway,
it’s not certain these guys can look beyond the sagging values of
economic growth. What I see in the future is a wide-open world where
everyone can make a difference amidst the most unexpected circumstances.
For the moment at least this is an incredibly light period, a time for
escaping gravity. It’s a time for invention. Learn some new moves in a
zero-G world.

ciao, BH

***

Foreign Affairs, January 31, 2011

“A G-Zero World”

The New Economic Club Will Produce Conflict, Not Cooperation

Ian Bremmer and Nouriel Roubini

This is not a G-20 world. Over the past several months, the expanded
group of leading economies has gone from a would-be concert of nations
to a cacophony of competing voices as the urgency of the financial
crisis has waned and the diversity of political and economic values
within the group has asserted itself. Nor is there a viable G-2 — a
U.S.-Chinese solution for pressing transnational problems — because
Beijing has no interest in accepting the burdens that come with
international leadership. Nor is there a G-3 alternative, a grouping of
the United States, Europe, and Japan that might ride to the rescue.

Today, the United States lacks the resources to continue as the primary
provider of global public goods. Europe is fully occupied for the moment
with saving the eurozone. Japan is likewise tied down with complex
political and economic problems at home. None of these powers’
governments has the time, resources, or domestic political capital
needed for a new bout of international heavy lifting. Meanwhile, there
are no credible answers to transnational challenges without the direct
involvement of emerging powers such as Brazil, China, and India. Yet
these countries are far too focused on domestic development to welcome
the burdens that come with new responsibilities abroad.

We are now living in a G-Zero world, one in which no single country or
bloc of countries has the political and economic leverage — or the will
— to drive a truly international agenda. The result will be intensified
conflict on the international stage over vitally important issues, such
as international macroeconomic coordination, financial regulatory
reform, trade policy, and climate change. This new order has
far-reaching implications for the global economy, as companies around
the world sit on enormous stockpiles of cash, waiting for the current
era of political and economic uncertainty to pass. Many of them can
expect an extended wait.

THE OLD BOYS’ CLUB
Until the mid-1990s, the G-7 was the international bargaining table of
greatest importance. Its members shared a common set of values and a
faith that democracy and market-driven capitalism were the systems most
likely to generate lasting peace and prosperity.

In 1997, the U.S.-dominated G-7 became the U.S.-dominated G-8, as U.S.
and European policymakers pulled Russia into the club. This change did
not reflect a shift in the world’s balance of power. It was simply an
effort to bolster Russia’s fragile democracy and help prevent the
country from sliding back into communism or nationalist militarism. The
transition from the G-7 to the G-8 did not challenge assumptions about
the virtues of representative government or the dangers of extensive
state management of economic growth.

The recent financial crisis and global market meltdown have sent a much
larger shock wave through the international system than anything that
followed the collapse of the Soviet bloc. In September 2008, fears that
the global economy stood on the brink of catastrophe hastened the
inevitable transition to the G-20, an organization that includes the
world’s largest and most important emerging-market states. The first
gatherings of the club — in Washington in November 2008 and London in
April 2009 — produced an agreement on joint monetary and fiscal
expansion,increased funding for the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
and new rules for financial institutions. These successes came mainly
because all the members felt threatened by the same plagues at the same
time.

But as the economic recovery began, the sense of crisis abated in some
countries. It became clear that China and other large developing
economies had suffered less damage and would recover faster than the
world’s wealthiest countries. Chinese and Indian banks had been less
exposed than Western ones to the contagion effects from the meltdown of
U.S. and European banks. Moreover, China’s foreign reserves had
protected its government and banks from the liquidity panic that took
hold in the West. Beijing’s ability to direct state spending toward
infrastructure projects quickly generated new jobs, easing fears that
the decline in U.S. and European consumer demand might trigger
large-scale unemployment and civil unrest in China.

As China and other emerging countries rebounded, the West’s fear and
frustration grew more intense. In the United States, stubbornly high
unemployment and fears of a double-dip recession fueled a rise in
antigovernment activism and shifted power to the Republicans.
Governments fell out of favor in France and Germany — and lost
elections in Japan and the United Kingdom. Fiscal crises provoked
intense public anger from Greece to Ireland and the Baltic states to Spain.

Meanwhile, Brazil, China, India, Turkey, and other developing countries
moved forward as the developed world remained stuck in an anemic
recovery. (Ironically, the only major developing country that has
struggled to recover is the petrostate Russia, the first state welcomed
into the G-7 club.) As the wealthy and the developing states’ needs and
interests began to diverge, the G-20 and other international
institutions lost the sense of urgency they needed to produce
coordinated and coherent multilateral policy responses.

Politicians in Western countries, battered by criticism that they have
failed to produce a robust recovery, have blamed scapegoats overseas.
U.S.-Chinese political tensions have risen significantly over the past
several months. China continues to defy calls from Washington to allow
the value of its currency to rise substantially. Policymakers in Beijing
insist that they must protect their country during a delicate moment in
its development, as lawmakers in Washington become more serious about
taking action against Chinese trade and currency policies that they say
are unfair. In the past three years, there has been a sharp spike in the
number of domestic trade and World Trade Organization cases that China
and the United States have filed against each other. Meanwhile, the G-20
has gone froma modestly effective international institution to an active
arena of conflict.

THE EMPTY DRIVER’S SEAT
There is nothing new about this bickering and inaction. Four decades
after the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, for example, the major powers
still have not agreed on how to build and maintain an effective
nonproliferation regime that can halt the spread of the world’s most
dangerous weapons and technologies. In fact, global defense policy has
always been essentially a zero-sum game, as one country or bloc of
countries works to maximize its defense capabilities in ways that
(deliberately or indirectly) challenge the military preeminence of its
rivals.

International commerce is a different game; trade can benefit all
players. But the divergence of economic interests in the wake of the
financial crisis has undermined global economic cooperation, throwing a
wrench into the gears of globalization. In the past, the global economy
has relied on a hegemon — the United Kingdom in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries and the United States in the twentieth century —
to create the security framework necessary for free markets, free trade,
and capital mobility. But the combination of Washington’s declining
international clout, on the one hand, and sharp policy disagreements, on
the other — both between developed and developing states and between
the United States and Europe — has created a vacuum of international
leadership just at the moment when it is most needed.

For the past 20 years, whatever their differences on security issues,
governments of the world’s major developed and developing states have
had common economic goals. The growth of China and India provided
Western consumers with access to the world’s fastest-growing markets and
helped U.S. and European policymakers manage inflation through the
import of inexpensively produced goods and services. The United States,
Europe, and Japan have helped developing economies create jobs by buying
huge volumes of their exports and by maintaining relative stability in
international politics.

But for the next 20 years, negotiations on economic and trade issues are
likely to be driven by competition just as much as recent debates over
nuclear nonproliferation and climate change have. The Doha Round is as
dead as the dodo, and the World Trade Organization cannot manage the
surge of protectionist pressures that has emerged with the global slowdown.

Conflicts over trade liberalization have recently pitted the United
States, the European Union, Brazil, China, India, and other emerging
economies against one another as each government looks to protect its
own workers and industries,often at the expense of outsiders. Officials
in many European countries have complained that Ireland’s corporate tax
rate is too low and last year pushed the Irish government to accept a
bailout it needed but did not want. German voters are grousing about the
need to bail out poorer European countries, and the citizens of southern
European nations are attacking their governments’ unwillingness to
continue spending beyond their means.

Before last November’s G-20 summit in Seoul, Brazilian and Indian
officials joined their U.S. and European counterparts to complain that
China manipulates the value of its currency. Yet when the Americans
raised the issue during the forum itself, Brazil’s finance minister
complained that the U.S. policy of “quantitative easing” amounted to
much the same unfair practice, and Germany’s foreign minister described
U.S. policy as “clueless.”

Other intractable disagreements include debates over subsidies for
farmers in the United States and Europe, the protection of intellectual
property rights, and the imposition of antidumping measures and
countervailing duties. Concerns over the behavior of sovereign wealth
funds have restricted the ability of some of them to take controlling
positions in Western companies, particularly in the United States. And
China’s rush to lock down reliable long-term access to natural resources
— which has led Beijing to aggressively buy commodities in Africa,
Latin America, and other emerging markets — is further stoking conflict
with Washington.

Asset and financial protectionism are on the rise, too. A Chinese
state-owned oil company attempted to purchase the U.S. energy firm
Unocal in 2005, and a year later, the state-owned Dubai Ports World
tried to purchase a company that would allow it to operate several U.S.
ports: both ignited a political furor in Washington. This was simply the
precursor to similar acts of investment protectionism in Europe and
Asia. In fact, there are few established international guidelines for
foreign direct investment — defining what qualifies as “critical
infrastructure,” for example — and this is precisely the sort of
politically charged problem that will not be addressed successfully
anytime soon on the international stage.

The most important source of international conflict may well come from
debates over how best to ensure that an international economic meltdown
never happens again. Future global monetary and financial stability will
require much greater international coordination on the regulation and
supervision of the financial system. Eventually, they may even require a
global super-regulator, given that capital is mobile while regulatory
policies remain national. But disagreements on these issues run deep.
The governments of many developing countries fear that the creation of
tighter international rules for financial firms would bind them more
tightly to the financial systems of the very Western economies that they
blame for creating the recent crisis. And there are significant
disagreements even among advanced economies on how to reform the system
of regulation and supervision of financial institutions.

Global trade imbalances remain wide and are getting even wider,
increasing the risk of currency wars — not only between the United
States and China but also among other emerging economies. There is
nothing new about these sorts of disagreements. But the still fragile
state of the global economy makes the need to resolve them much more
urgent, and the vacuum of international leadership will make their
resolution profoundly difficult to achieve.

WHO NEEDS TO DOLLAR?
Following previous crises in emerging markets, such as the Asian
financial meltdown of the late 1990s, policy makers in those economies
committed themselves to maintaining weak currencies, running current
account surpluses, and self-insuring against liquidity runs by
accumulating huge foreign exchange reserves. This strategy grew in part
from a mistrust that the IMF could be counted on to act as the lender of
last resort. Deficit countries, such as the United States, see such
accumulations of reserves as a form of trade mercantilism that prevents
undervalued currencies from appreciating. Emerging-market economies, in
turn, complain that U.S. fiscal and current account deficits could
eventually cause the collapse of the U.S. dollar, even as these deficits
help build up the dollar assets demanded by those countries accumulating
reserves. This is a rerun of the old Triffin dilemma, an economic
observation of what happens when the country that produces the reserve
currency must run deficits to provide international liquidity,deficits
that eventually debase the currency’s value as a stable international
reserve.

Meanwhile, debates over alternatives to the U.S. dollar, including that
of giving a greater role to Special Drawing Rights (an international
reserve asset based on a basket of five national currencies created by
the IMF to supplement gold and dollar reserves), as China has
recommended, are going nowhere, largely because Washington has no
interest in any move that would undermine the central role of the
dollar. Nor is it likely that China’s yuan will soon supplant the dollar
as a major reserve currency, because for the yuan to do so, Beijing
would have to allow its exchange rate to fluctuate, reduce its controls
on capital inflows and outflows, liberalize its domestic capital
markets, and create markets for yuan-denominated debt. That is a
long-term process that would present many near-term threats to China’s
political and economic stability.

In addition, energy producers are resisting policies aimed at
stabilizing price volatility through a more flexible energy supply.
Meanwhile, net energy exporters, especially Russia, continue to use
threats to halt the flow of gas as a primary foreign policy weapon
against neighboring states. Net energy consumers, for their part, are
resisting policies, such as carbon taxes, that would reduce their
dependency on fossil fuels. Similar tensions derive from the sharply
rising prices of food and other commodities. Conflicts over these issues
come at a time when economic anxiety is high and no single country or
bloc of countries has the clout to help drive a truly international
approach to resolving them.

From 1945 until 1990, the global balance of power was defined primarily
by relative differences in military capability. It was not market-moving
innovation or cultural dynamism that bolstered the Soviet bloc’s
prominence within a bipolar international system. It was raw military
power. Today, it is the centrality of China and other emerging powers to
the future of the global economy, not the numbers of their citizens
under arms or the weapons at their disposal, that make their choices
crucial for the United States’ future.

This is the core of the G-Zero dilemma. The phrase “collective security”
conjures up NATO and its importance for peace and prosperity across
Europe. But as the eurozone crisis vividly demonstrates, there is no
collective economic security in a globalized economy. Whereas Europe’s
interest rates once converged based on the assumption that southern
European countries were immune to default risks and eastern European
states were lined up to join the euro, now there is fear of a contagion
within the walls that might one day bring down the entire eurozone
enterprise.

Beyond Europe, those who make policy, whether in a market-based
democracy such as the United States or an authoritarian capitalist state
such as China, must worry first and foremost about growth and jobs at
home. Ambitions to bolster the global economy are a distant second.
There is no longer a Washington consensus, but nor will there ever be a
Beijing consensus, because Chinese-style state capitalism is designed to
meet China’s unique needs. It is that rare product that China has no
interest in exporting.

Indeed, because each government must work to build domestic security and
prosperity to fit its own unique political, economic, geographic,
cultural, and historical circumstances, state capitalism is a system
that must be unique to every country that practices it. This is why,
despite pledges recorded in G-20 communiqués to “avoid the mistakes of
the past,” protectionism is alive and well. It is why the process of
creating a new international financial architecture is unlikely to
create a structure that complies with any credible building code. And it
is why the G-Zero era is more likely to produce protracted conflict than
anything resembling a new Bretton Woods.

lepsie v: http://burundi.sk/dusan/carrythatweight/images/5/51/Pzi.esej.research.txt

semiotexte’s Foucault: Fearless Speech (2001)
prednasky v EN @ uni of cal in berkeley z 10-11/83 (dnes som inak komentoval assangeovo video
zeditovane pearsonom v 85

goal:
” My intention was not to deal with the problem of truth, but with the problem of truth-teller or truth-telling as an activity.
By this I mean that, for me, it was not a question of analyzing the internal or external criteria that would enable the Greeks and Romans,
or anyone else, to recognize whether a statement or proposition is true or not. At issue for me was rather the attempt
to consider truth-telling as a specific activity, or as a role. ” Discourse & Truth, Concluding remarks by Foucault.
/ ciel: nie schopnost urcit ci je vyrok pravdivy alebo nie, ale chapat pravdomluvnost ako specificku aktivitu, ako rolu.
” With the question of the importance of telling the truth, knowing who is able to tell the truth,
and knowing why we should tell the truth, we have the roots of what we could call the ‘critical’ tradition in the West.”

CHECK [107] – practice of parrhesia @ human relationships

[p 11-20]
[core] parrhesia = frankness + truth + criticism + danger + duty
– being ‘FRANK’ (instead of PERSUASION), povedat vsetko co mam na mysli, nic neskryvam
parrhesia – 2 types:
– ‘bad’ parrhesia ~ not far from ‘chattering’, saying any/everything one has in mind w/o qualification;
everyone has the right to address his fellow citizens even with the most stupid or dangerous things in the city;
verbal activity which reflects every movement of heart & mind
/ blogging, comments, twitter, ‘kazdy prd’ na youtube, total transparency freak leaking
– [core] positive parrhesia, ‘to tell the TRUTH’ (instead of FALSEHOOD or SILENCE);
p says what he _thinks_ is true [via mind], or does he say what _is_ really true [via ontology] ? —
he says what is true because he _knows_ that it _is_ true [mind+ontology], and he _knows_ that it is true because it is really true [mind+?].
~ there is exact coincidence bwn belief & truth [v grecku sa stretavali verbalne; v dnesnej kartezianskej koncepcii dokazu sa stretavaju mentalne]
/ je pravda, a niektore jej casti poznam.
cize nielenze je uprimny, ale navyse jeho nazor je pravdivy.
[core] cize zaroven tomu veri a zaroven to je pravda.
v grecku je pristup k pravde dany moralkou, ak mam urcite moralne vlastnosti, tak mam pristup k pravde (a tiez k jej odovzdaniu dalsim).
[core] u descarta to je inak, on si nie je isty ci to comu veri, je tiez pravda.
[core] ‘proof’ of sincerity of truth-teller is his ‘courage’
ak clovek povie nieco nebezpecne, je velke podozrenie ze je truth-teller.
vtedy sa pytame sami seba: je naozaj truth-teller? a – ako si moze byt isty ze to comu veri je pravda? (ta druha otazka sa grekov moc netyka, neriesili to)
[core] podmienka pre parrhesiu je pritomnost nebezpecenstva, ‘DANGER’, ze teller nieco riskuje
(napr ucitel povie detom ze ich uci – tym nic neriskuje, ale ked filozof povie tyranovi ze tyrania je zla lebo neni kompatibilna so spravodlivostou, tak riskuje)
[!] tyran neni truth-teller, lebo nic neriskuje
[core] a ten danger vychadza vzdy z druhych stran, nevrham sa do danger sam (napriklad pred sudom povedat nieco co moze byt proti mne zneuzite).
confession to someone who exercises power over speaker, and is able to censure or punish him for what he has done,
[core] takze funkcia p nie je demonstrovat pravdu druhemu, ale kritizovat ho = ‘CRITICISM’ (instead of FLATTERY),
alebo aj criticism sam voci sebe (ale vzdy ked speaker je v inferior pozicii).
[core] vzdy slabsi voci silnejsiemu (nie naopak, napr rodic voci dietatu, ale: filozof tyrana, ziak ucitela, obcan vacsinu)
[core] telling the truth is regarded as a (moral) ‘DUTY’ (instead of SELF-INTEREST and MORAL APATHY)
ked ma nikto netlaci hovorit, ale ja citim povinnost prehovorit, mam ‘FREEDOM’ prehovorit (nie som pod natlakom).
napr kriminal – p neni ked sa prizna pred sudom, ale ked sa prizna dobrovolne z moralnej povinnosti.
kritizovat priatela alebo panovnika – lebo je moja duty mu pomoct (kedze on nevidi jeho wrongdoings).

…..
/ !!!!! takze denouncement neni kompatibilny s parrhesiou !!!!
skor truthful criticism of a friend out of duty (risking our friendship), for his own good (and my good too)

[p 20-24]
tracing evolution of parrhesia via r/p/p:
rhetoric (long speech) is in strong opposition to parrhesia (dialogue) @socratic-platonic tradition,
ale neskor sa zacali blizit – parrhesia/freespeech ako retoricka figura (ktora ale nema prikrasy, a neni vlastne figura) & intesifies audience emotions
politics
@ atenska demokracia – which is def as constitution (politeia) in which ppl enjoyed ‘demokratia’, ‘isegoria’ (equal right of speech),
‘isonomia’ (equal part of all citizens in exercise of power), and ‘parrhesia’,
parrhesia appears in agora
@ hellenistic period – it’s advisor’s duty to use parrhesia to help king w/ decisions, and to prevent him from abusing his power (cize je dobra aj pre ludi),
ak ho kral ignoruje alebo tresta, je tyran,
parrhesia doesnt appear in agora anymore (iba medzi kralom a radcami, mimo dohlad ludi)
philosophy @ field of art of life
socrates in plato writings is p,
rel to ‘care of oneself’

[p 104]
[core] care of the self – what i think corresponds to what i say, and it corresponds to what i do (as in case of socrates, ultimate truth-teller) (?)
parrhesia = logos ~ truth ~ bios @ ethics; logos ~ truth ~ nomos @ politics
philosophical (new) parrhesia
– 3 types [p 106]:
1
2
3
– target: not to persuade the Assembly, but to convince someone that he must take care of himself and of others (= change his life)
– not specifically linked to agora or king’s court, but diverse places

z Santner, Eric L – On Creaturely Life. Rilke, Benjamin, Sebald.pdf

[ch 1]
‘state of exception’ (o nej pisem v eseji 1) – sebald’s ‘creaturely life’ (@santner’s book), heidegger, agamben, rilke, benjamin (‘petrified unrest’)
~ how human bodies and psyches register the “states of exception” that punctuate the “normal” run of social and political life.
The “essential disruption” that renders man “creaturely” for these writers has, that is, a distinctly political—or better, biopolitical—
aspect; it names the threshold where life becomes a matter of politics and politics comes to inform the very matter and materiality of life.
(eg. German Jews)
[ch 3]
~ ‘undeadness’ – the space between real and symbolic death = ultimate domain of creaturely life.
@ Sebald: the vampire, the Wandering Jew, Kafka’s hunter Gracchus, and Balzac’s Colonel Chabert.
( + zizek’s exception book )
[ch 4]
“postmemory,” a term coined by Marianne Hirsch to capture the peculiarities of the memory of events that hover
between personal memory and impersonal history, events one has not lived through oneself but that, in large measure through exposure
to the stories of those who did experience them, have nonetheless entered into the fabric of the self.
/ oralne historie nezazitych velkych eventov (00s o 60s)
freud’s ‘uncanny’ = ?

lepsie v: http://burundi.sk/dusan/carrythatweight/images/5/51/Pzi.esej.research.txt

polit econ

[186] Badiou – 3 mozne zlyhania revolucnej lavice
=> vsetko zle. treba revolucneho agenta ktory je neoddelitelnou sucastou systemu dostat do subjektivity
/ akoze treba byt politickejsi? a revolucnejsi v kazdodennosti?

Marx pre-1850s: ‘Marxist’ theory
ciel, postcapitalist society, je socialna forma kde transhistoricka praca, oslobodena od fetters of trhu a osobneho vlastnictva,
has openly emerged as the regulating principle of society.
‘economic base’ vs legal/ideological ‘superstructure’
naive historicist evolutionism ~ ahistorical absolutization of labor (process of mat prod and repr of life) as ‘key’ to other phenomena
cosi s Heideggerovou dialectic-of-Enlitenment temou technokratickej ‘instrumental reason’ to ma, ze domination is grounded in very notion of labor
eg. German Ideology

Marx v 1850s inspirovany znovucitanim Hegelovej Science of Logic, vsetko prehodnotil a skomplikoval
mainly in: Grundrisse, a najma Capital
dosiel na to ze commodity fetishism ako iluzia nie je len sekundarna reflection, ale operuje v srdci ‘realneho procesu vyroby’
cize uloha nie je odhalit ako sa z bezneho reallife objektu stava fetisizovana komodita (mysterious theological entity),
ale odhalit ‘metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties’ v naoko beznom objekte
comm fetish = belief that commodities are magical objects with inherent metaphysical powers
Karatani: marx inak zacal tym ze kritika nabozenstva je pociatok vsetkej kritiky, presiel ku kritike filozofie, a skoncil pri kritike polit econ,
pri ktorej sa oblukom dostal naspat k tomu ze viera (v objekty) je v srdci ‘prizemnej’ ekonomickej aktivity

Engels tiez chapal produkciu jednak v ekonomickom zmysle (extrakcia komodit z prirody), jednak v spolocenskom (produkcia zivota, napr rodenie)

born 68

wl contains 4 large-scale trends in society:
* change in the materiality of communication.
Communication becomes more extensive, more recorded, and the records become more mobile
* crisis of institutions, particularly in western democracies
* rise of new actors, “super-empowered” individuals, capable of intervening into historical developments at a systemic level
* structural transformation of the public sphere (through media consolidation at one pole, and the explosion of non-institutional publishers at the other),
rivals Habermas’ version

9/11: kritika ze aparat sa o tom nedozvedel lebo nebol dostatocne prepojeny
inability to connect data located in different bureaucratic domains was one of the main criticisms coming out the enquires into the 9/11 attacks.
->
wikileaks ukazuje ze teraz su prepojeni, ale k files maju pristup kvanta ludi
Within certain organisation such as banks and the military, virtually everything is classified and large number of people have access to this data
=
There is an inherent paradox. Vast streams of classified records need to flow freely in order to sustain complex,
distributed and time-sensitive operations. Yet, since the information is classified, it needs to flow within strict
boundaries which cannot be clearly defined on a general level (after all, you never know what needs to get connected
with what in advance), and it needs to flow through many, many hands. This creates the techno-organisational preconditions
for massive amounts of information to leak out.

zamestnanci corps a statneho aparatu leakuju lebo sa necitia identifikovani s org… ich miesta su nahraditelne [weber’s rational-legal org]
a corp od nich chce aby boli kreativni a samostatni, a oni vedia ze ich berie ako docasny naklad/zdroj
-> tato disonancia produkuje motivaciu leaknut

WL created a custom-made infrastructure to receive these torrents of records.
WL managed for the first time to create an effective infrastructure for anonymous communication.
/ mirrored DNSs, mirrored content, ssh, tor access/uploads, pgp v mailoch.. server v atomovom kryte.. networked org.. not paid..
/ takze ma doveru potencionalnych whistleblowerov, ktori navyse vidia ze leak infa bude mat dosah
!! na rozdiel od piratebay:
they built social intelligence (filtering, editorial control) into the system in order to encourage only one type of anonymous speech – whistle-blowing – while insulating themselves from the usual criticisms of anonymous communication (child-porn trafficking and the like).

; rhetorics
moralist – Blair’s “humanitarian wars” to advance human rights; Irak aj Afganistan – prinesieme demokraciu a prosperitu, vytiahneme ich z obc.vojny, oslobodime zeny. vojaci mozu byt na to hrdi
/ ? ale na druhej strane je Assange tiez moralista, resp etik – bojuje proti cenzure, za hodnoty slobody tlace a slobody prejavu, ciel ma odhalovat opresivne rezimy. chce vyriesit problem cenzury tlace a prejavu (press and whistleblowers)
/ ? su motivy WL moralisticke? alebo eticke? aky rozdel medzi moral and ethical? – asi nie, obe: good/evil, right/wrong, virtue/vice, justice..

super-empowered individuals
Military strategists have been talking about ‘super-empowered individuals’ by which they mean someone who
“is autonomously capable of creating a cascading event, […] a “system perturbation”; a disruption of system function and invalidation of existing rule sets to at least the national but more likely the global scale. The key requirements to become “superempowered” are comprehension of a complex system’s connectivty and operation; access to critical network hubs; possession of a force that can be leveraged against the structure of the system and a wilingness to use it”
http://zenpundit.blogspot.com/2006/10/super-empowered-individual-man-is.html
..this concept has been exclusively applied to terrorism and it reduces structural dynamics to individual actions.
=> individuals, supported by small, networked organisations, can now intervene in social dynamics at a systemic level, for the better or worse.

shows strenghts & weaknesses of being centred around single charismatic individual
weak: authoritarianism, lack of internal procedure, dangers of burnout and internal and external attacks on the credibility of that single person (if not worse)
/ tu sa ale mina.. otazka je ci je assange naozaj taky centralny… aj ked mi tuto ideu zatial nenarusilo nic… asi fakt je.

research z vela zdrojov
lepsia verzia v txt:

—>udalost roka v politike?

http://blogs.forbes.com/andygreenberg/2010/11/29/an-interview-with-wikileaks-julian-assange/
next: zaciatkom 2011 leak internej dokumentacie US banky

http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/blog/2010/nov/29/wikileaks-us-embassy-cables-live-updates

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/the-us-embassy-cables
cela sekcia v guardiane venovana jednotlivym leakom

SUMMARY OF CABLEGATE CONTEXT
5 medii: NYT, Guardian, Le Monde, El Pais, Der Spiegel
NYT editor Kellher: The London newspaper, The Guardian, gave us a copy of the archive, because they considered it a continuation of our collaboration on earlier WikiLeaks disclosures. (The Guardian initially asked us not to reveal that they were our source, but the paper’s editor said on Sunday night that he was no longer concerned about anonymity.)
wall street journal odmietol, lebo mal podpisat dohodu bez toho ze by vedeli co dokumenty obsahuju.
na http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/ publikuju ~140 docs/day (dovedna 251,287 documents, comprising 261,276,536 words….
7x vacsie ako iraq war logs, the world’s previously largest classified information release), bude to trvat niekolko mesiacov.
vybrane media ich asi dostavaju o den skor alebo tak.
cables date from 28.12.1966 till 28.2.2010.
confidential communications between 274 embassies/consulates/diplomatic missions in countries throughout the world and the State Department in Washington DC.
15,652 of the cables are classified Secret.
The cables show the extent of US spying on its allies and the UN;
turning a blind eye to corruption and human rights abuse in “client states”;
backroom deals with supposedly neutral countries;
lobbying for US corporations;
and the measures US diplomats take to advance those who have access to them.
leaked from SIPRNet – us gov agency internet internal network (pristup ma 2.5 mil ludi, civilian/military/private sector personnel, aj 20-somethings vojaci), vytvoreny po 9/11
assange ma vo wikileaks org rolu pritahovania kritiky a pozornosti (aby org fungovala v chode) – je to tazke, ale na druhej strane dostava credit.
“we have always exptected the tremendous criticism. it is my role to be a lightning rod, to attract the attacks against the organisation
where i work. and that is a difficult role. on the other hand i also get an undue(?) credit.”

MAJOR LEAKS
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/28/us-embassy-cable-leak-diplomacy-crisis
(TOP) UN: US officials have been instructed to spy on the UN leadership.
(TOP) US-Arabs-Iran: Arab leaders are privately urging an air strike on Iran
US does not secretly want to go to war with Iran but it has resisted pressure to do so from Israel and Arab leaders acting out of a coincidental common interest.
(TOP) North Korea: China wants Korean reunification. [asi preto lebo hrozi vojna s Juznou]
US claim Iran bought 19 BM-25 missiles from North Korea. [Russia doesnt believe it, neither the existence of missiles] / http://www.commondreams.org/view/2010/11/30
At the request of the Obama administration, The New York Times has agreed not to publish the text of the cable.
@WL: http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10STATE17263.html
How the hacker attacks which forced Google to quit China in January were orchestrated by a senior member of the Politburo who typed his own name into the global version of the search engine and found articles criticising him personally.
use by Berlusconi of a “shadowy” Russian-speaking Italian go-between.
Russia and its intelligence agencies are using mafia bosses to carry out criminal operations = “virtual mafia state”.
Putin as an “alpha-dog”, Hamid Karzai as being “driven by paranoia” while Angela Merkel allegedly “avoids risk and is rarely creative”.
Yemeni president Abdullah Saleh said: “We’ll continue saying they are our bombs, not yours.”
US nuclear weapons still left in Europe are based in Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and Turkey. The four nations have been long suspected of hosting the warheads, but NATO and the governments involved have always refused to confirm this.
+
* PAKISTAN: US believes under economic pressure they may sell enriched Uranium (capable of making a nuke) to terrorists
* KOREA: US and South Korea discussed a unified Korea, and SK has considered commercial inducements to China in order to get it
* GUANTANAMO BAY: The US has pressured countries to take prisoners from there (into their own prisons) in return for favors
* AFGHANISTAN: The Afghan Vice-President was found with $52million in cash when visiting UAE (implying massive levels of corruption)
* CHINA: China really did hack Google China, and has also hacked western government and corporate PCs
* SAUDI ARABIA: Saudi donors are still the chief sponsors of Al Qaeda + King Abdullah dislikes Iraqi and Pakistani leaders
* RUSSIA: Putin and Berlusconi are bffs to the point that Berlusconi is Russia’s mouthpiece in Europe (talk of lavish gifts both ways)
* LEBANON: US failed to stop Syria from (secretly and against agreement) supplying arms to Hezbolla which now has a massive stockpile of them
* GERMANY: US warned Germany not to arrest CIA officers involved in a bungled kidnapping of German civilian
* ISRAEL: Concerns it will strike Iran if Iran continues nuclear development
* YEMEN: Took credit on US’ request for missile strike on Al Qaeda
* IRAN: US is getting increasingly worried that Iran has the capabilites to produce Uranium, Ahmadinejad was also compared to Hitler
* LIBYA: Qaddafi has a “Ukrainian nurse” companion that never leaves his side + he reneged on a deal to return uranium to Russia
* BRITAIN: Cameron has been reported to be “easily intimidated” and “indecisive” by US Intelligence
* ARGENTINA: Hillary Clinton wanted to know if President Cristina Fernandez is a batshit crazy bitch and if she was taking drugs.
* VENEZUELA: Chavez should be isolated from the world.
+
cables are unlikely to gratify conspiracy theorists. They do not contain evidence of assassination plots, CIA bribery or such criminal enterprises as the Iran-Contra scandal in the Reagan years, when anti-Nicaraguan guerrillas were covertly financed.
(since “top secret” files are not circulating @ siprnet)
takze low level data (tiez povedal Ellsberg)

PUBLIC RESPONSES
v komentoch: dokumenty hovoria o tom co uz davno vieme ~ “no surprises” ~
WikiLeaks files only fill in details about what has generally already been known.
“There’s nothing new here, but WikiLeaks is dangerous!”
kontra: usa vedie tajnu vojnu proti al-qaide v jemene, dohoda s jemenskym prezidentom ze budu dalej hovorit ze na nich hadzu svoje bomby;
US spies on UN officials
A Sunday Times journalist suggested his mother’s lasagne recipe was secret, but that didn’t make it interesting.
vs: dat ho za mreze / zabit
21:34 < pht`> symbolicky poriadok ako zdielane klamstvo, o ktorom to kazdy vie, ale predsa sa udrzuje
sebej: jalova senzacia
+
velkolepe media headlines:
“new age of transparency”
“age of leaks”
“First Major Event in the New Epoch of Information Transparency”
….leaks tu boli aj predtym, napr watergate, dokumenty sa sirili fotografiou
+
heather brooke: ak vlada zaklada svoju moc na informaciach, je tazke ju monopolizovat, pretoze moze byt velmi lahko dispersed
ROZDIEL – toto su udalosti z celeho sveta, worldwide significance
+ ..
Larry Sanger, co-founder of Wikipedia: “@wikileaks Speaking as Wikipedia’s co-founder, I consider you enemies of the U.S.–not just the government, but the people.”
Max Boot, senior fellow at the US foreign affairs thinktank the Council on Foreign Relations: “This is journalism as pure vandalism.”

CONDEMNATION – “international condemnation of WikiLeaks” & arguments to shut WL down [by politicians all over the world, int’l orgs, etc..]
is putting at risk the lives and the freedom of countless Americans and non-Americans around the world. [hypocrisy]
damage to national security.
H Clinton: leaks imperils lives and US diplomatic efforts.
“this disclosure is not just an attack on America’s foreign policy interests, it is an attack on the international community, the alliances and partnerships, the conversations and negotiations that safeguard global security and advance economic prosperity.”
“I want to make clear that our official foreign policy is not set in these messages but here in Washington.”
“Every country, including the United States, must be able to have candid [uprimny] conversations about the people and nations with whom they deal. And every country, including the United States, must be able to have honest, private dialogue with other countries about issues of common concern. I know that diplomats around the world share this view… We count on the space of trust that confidentiality provides. When someone breaches that trust, we are all worse off.”
right-wing Le Figaro, close to the French government, ran an editorial entitled “The tyranny of transparency” saying: “The massive diffusion of secret documents belonging to American diplomacy is an act of malice, about which it would be very naïve to rejoice.”
Socialist party was as critical of the leaks as Sarkozy’s right-wing UMP party. The socialist Jean-Christophe Cambadélis complained of “the tyranny of transparency with no limits” .
Francois Baroin, FR budget minister and government spokesman, told Europe1 radio, “I always thought a transparent society would be a totalitarian society.”
IT foreign minister Frattini: “the 9/11 of world diplomacy”;
IT head of Frattini’s party in the lower house of parliament: the documents were representative of a new form of “media terrorism”
US Republican congressman Peter King: WL should be treated as a terrorist organisation.
Ahmadinejad: disclosure that Arab states wanted to attack Iran was not a genuine leak, but part of a US campaign of psychological warfare.
Some part of the American government produced these documents. We don’t think this information was leaked. We think it was organised to be released on a regular basis and they are pursuing political goals.
WikiLeaks “game” is “not worth commenting upon and that no one would waste their time reviewing them”.
FR gov: attack on democracy
Rep congressman Peter Hoekstra of Michigan: “The catastrophic issue here is just a breakdown in trust,”
many other countries – allies and foes alike – are likely to ask, ‘Can the United States be trusted? Can the United States keep a secret?'”
foreign policy hawk Lieberman: “I hope we are doing everything we can to take down their website.”

q of creative act
PZI otazka: je na wikileaks nieco kreativne? v zmysle whiteheada… does it give us something new? if yes, what is it?
ukazuje silu (taktickeho) filesharingu. [takticky zacal byt s iraq war logs, ked dali obsah najprv vybranym global mediam]
ake fikcie vytvara? W’s propositions as fiction-actual border object; “the tales that might be told about particular actualities”
existuje nejaka seriozna analyza wikileaks? napr z pohladu OOO?
co ine by sa dalo spravit s tymito docs? vykalibrovali to tak ze maju naozaj globalnu pozornost a generuju chaos, atomova memeticka bomba

q of public domain
releasing confidential gov data to public domain (where public gov data normally go)

q of accountability
na jednej strane debata o zopovednosti v suvislosti s transparentnostou, online identitou, ne-anonymnostou,
na druhej napr ranciere a bishop ktori argumentuju proti moral arguments / ethical standpoints
(podla ranciera dokonca pre-poeticky/pre-mimeticky/pre-reprezentivny), a PRO esteticky rezim umenia

q of responsibility
JA: I originally tried hard for the organisation to have no face, because I wanted egos to play no part in our activities. This followed the tradition of the French anonymous pure mathematians, who wrote under the collective allonym, “The Bourbaki”. However this quickly led to tremendous distracting curiosity about who and random individuals claiming to represent us. In the end, someone must be responsible to the public and only a leadership that is willing to be publicly courageous can genuinely suggest that sources take risks for the greater good. In that process, I have become the lightening rod. I get undue attacks on every aspect of my life, but then I also get undue credit as some kind of balancing force.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/blog/2010/dec/03/julian-assange-wikileaks

q information transparency
ako meni transparentnost politiku a diplomaciu? politicke strany propagujuce transparentnost vyhravaju hlasy, ale v polit stranickej praxi
je transp nepresaditelna. vid Veci Verejne cz, alebo SK watchdog NGO + SAS).
MTP open org.
Kelly: transparency required @ The Cloud
WL is a symptom not a feature, due to a lack of trust and transparency between US Gov and its people.
niekt0: teoreticky je mozne podhodit medzi 100 pravych dokumentov jeden falosny
There is a certain vicious amorality about the Mark Zuckerberg-ian philosophy that all transparency is always and everywhere a good thing, particularly when it’s uttered by the guy who’s busily monetizing your radical transparency.
Julian Assange and the Computer Conspiracy; “To destroy this invisible government”
novinari exposing secrets – selfish. And the way most journalists “expose” secrets as a professional practice — to the extent that they do — is just as narrowly selfish: because they publicize privacy only when there is profit to be made in doing so, they keep their eyes on the valuable muck they are raking, and learn to pledge their future professional existence on a continuing and steady flow of it. In muck they trust.
goal: not transparency, but just society. “It is not our goal to achieve a more transparent society; it’s our goal to achieve a more just society.”
Wikileaks “practices civil obedience, that is, we are an organization that tries to make the world more civil and act against abusive organizations that are pushing it in the opposite direction.”
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2034040-3,00.html
secrecy is not evil. “We keep secret the identity of our sources, as an example, [and] take great pains to do it. So secrecy is important for many things but shouldn’t be used to cover up abuses.”
(kym napr Zuckerberg je za dismissal of all secrecy)
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2034040-3,00.html

q of censorship
JA: The west has fiscalised its basic power relationships through a web of contracts, loans, shareholdings, bank holdings and so on. In such an environment it is easy for speech to be “free” because a change in political will rarely leads to any change in these basic instruments. Western speech, as something that rarely has any effect on power, is, like badgers and birds, free. In states like China, there is pervasive censorship, because speech still has power and power is scared of it. We should always look at censorship as an economic signal that reveals the potential power of speech in that jurisdiction. The attacks against us by the US point to a great hope, speech powerful enough to break the fiscal blockade.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/blog/2010/dec/03/julian-assange-wikileaks

assange’s portraits
Raffi Khatchadourian’s June portrait in The New Yorker, which makes Assange sound like a master spy in a John le Carré novel.
Tunku Varadarajan’s epic ad hominem bloviation in The Daily Beast: “With his bloodless, sallow face, his lank hair drained of all color, his languorous, very un-Australian limbs, and his aura of blinding pallor that appears to admit no nuance, Assange looks every inch the amoral, uber-nerd villain.”

wikileaks IS NOT assange – strategia prezitia v pripade vrazdy/zatknutia/zrusenia webu
WikiLeaks has released an encrypted 1.4 gigabyte file called “insurance.aes256.”
If something happens to Assange, the password to the encrypted file will be released (presumably via a single Twitter tweet).
What’s in the file? We don’t know.
at 1.4 gigabytes, it is nineteen times the size of the Afghan war log that was recently distributed to major newspapers.

BitTorrent Based DNS To Counter US Domain Seizures

hackers scandals in history
Gary McKinnon 66 aq 3 akbal I – get via blank or default pwds to Pentagon/US systems search for UFO/anti-gravity/free energy proofs
Daniel Ellsberg 31 ar 11 kan II – 71 released Pentagon Papers, study of US government decision-making about the Vietnam War, to The New York Times
inspirovany by epiphany he got @ 69 anti-Viet war speech by pacifist who was excited to be able to join his friends in prison.
via xerox.
ukazali ze Johnsonova administrativa vytrvalo klamala nielen verejnosti, ale aj Kongresu – vedeli ze vojnu asi nevyhraju a bude viac obeti ako
sa vseobecne predpokladalo.
novinar z Times porusil dohodu a publikovali komentar, Nixon zastavil vydavanie novin na 2 tyzdne, zatial ale Ellsberg leakol dalsim 18 novinam.
NYT a Wash Post vyhrali Supreme Court case proti vlade a mohli publikovat dokumenty bez cenzury ~ sloboda tlace je vyssia ako udrzat utajene info.
Brian Manning via Wikileaks
ROZDIEL – toto su udalosti z celeho sveta, worldwide significance

pre-emptive actions from politicians
Hillary Clinton obehla hlavnych spojencov a varovala ich ze vyjdu von leaky.
Clinton led a frantic damage limitation exercise this weekend as Washington prepared foreign governments for the revelations, contacting leaders in Germany, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf, France and Afghanistan.
new US ambassador to Pakistan, Cameron Munter, published an article on Nov 30 in a Pakistan’s English-language paper, the News, which aims to pre-empt unflattering references to the Pakistani government and its military.
“Of course, even a solid relationship will have its ups and downs,” he says, adding later that: “Honest dialogue – within governments and between them – is part of the basic bargain of international relations; we couldn’t maintain peace, security, and international stability without it. I’m sure that Pakistan’s ambassadors to the United States would say the same thing.”
(cables include allegations that the military is colluding with militant groups and unflattering pen portraits of leading politicians)

TRIVIA
Manning: “[I] listened and lip-synched to Lady Gaga’s Telephone while exfiltrating possibly the largest data spillage in American history.”
in “It was childishly easy. I would come in with music on a CD-RW labelled with something like ‘Lady Gaga’ … erase the music … then write a compressed split file. No one suspected a thing …”
he “had unprecedented access to classified networks 14 hours a day 7 days a week for 8+ months”.
Manning uploaded all files to “freedom of information activists” wikileaks.org (?!) — to muselo byt okolo 5 gb
Assange and his circle apparently decided against immediately making the cables public. Instead they embarked on staged disclosure of the other material – aimed, as they put it on their website, at “maximising political impact”.
Although none of the Wired articles ever mention this, the first Lamo-Manning communications were not actually via chat. Instead, Lamo told me that Manning first sent him a series of encrypted emails which Lamo was unable to decrypt because Manning “encrypted it to an outdated PGP key of mine” [PGP is an encryption program]. After receiving this first set of emails, Lamo says he replied — despite not knowing who these emails were from or what they were about — by inviting the emailer to chat with him on AOL IM, and provided his screen name to do so. Lamo says that Manning thereafter sent him additional emails encrypted to his current PGP key, but that Lamo never bothered to decrypt them. Instead, Lamo claims he turned over all those Manning emails to the FBI without ever reading a single one of them. Thus, the actual initial communications between Manning and Lamo — what preceded and led to their chat — are completely unknown. Lamo refuses to release the emails or chats other than the small chat snippets published by Wired.
teda manning nasiel lama cez twitter #wikileaks, poslal mu maily kryptovane jeho starym pgp klucom, lamo ich nevedel otvorit a poslal mu svoj aim nick, manning mu poslal dalsie maily s novym klucom, tie lamo vraj nedekryptoval a rovno ich poslal fbi
otazka teda preco si manning vybral prave lama; a preco lamo tvrdi ze ich neotvoril (asi sa boji ze by to z neho fbi vymazali:)
^ http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn_greenwald/2010/06/18/wikileaks/index.html

; ad censorship
Assange: “I am a journalist, a publisher and an inventor,” Assange says. “I have tried to invent a system that solves the problem of censorship of the press and the censorship of the whistle-blower across the whole world.”
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2007375,00.html

; aim: to expose oppresive regimes & to show how society really works right now
Wikileaks is developing an uncensorable Wikipedia for untraceable mass document leaking and analysis. Our primary interest is in exposing oppressive regimes in Asia, the former Soviet bloc, Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, but we also expect to be of assistance to people of all regions who wish to reveal unethical behavior in their governments and corporations. We aim for maximum political impact.
http://web.archive.org/web/20080314204422/http://www.wikileaks.org/wiki/Wikileaks:About
WL eg. published a manual from Camp Delta at Guantánamo Bay, an internal report commissioned by oil-trading company Trafigura detailing the dumping of potentially toxic material off the African coast and a video of a 2007 American helicopter attack that killed two Reuters journalists in Baghdad — which Reuters had lobbied unsuccessfully for years to have released. WikiLeaks’ release of documents alleging corruption in Kenya won the site an award from Amnesty International. And with the Afghan papers, Assange “has basically guaranteed that think tanks, academics and analysts will study his website for some time. It’s history right there on the Internet for everyone to see,” says Paul Rogers, a British academic and security correspondent for the website OpenDemocracy.net.
+
a http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WikiLeaks#Leaks
+
Assange @ Oslo Freedom Forum:
“So, in this broader framework of what we do, it is to try and build a historical record, an intellectual record,
of how civilisation actually works in practice, now, from the inside, everywhere, in every country around the World.
Because all our decisions, individual decisions, our political decisions, are based upon what we know. Humanity is
nothing but what we know and what we have. And what we have can be replaced, and degrades quickly. And what we know
is everything, and it is our limit of what we can be. So before we embark on any particular political stratagem,
we first have to know where we are because, if we do not know where we are, it is impossible for us to know where
we are going. Likewise, it is impossible to correct abuses unless we know that they are going on.”
[mind determinism~chuen*]
15:00 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qDvfQ5gZ-Jw
http://www.religiousforums.com/forum/political-debates/101236-transcript-julian-assange-wikileaks-speech-2010-a.html
+
Steven Levy, 1984′ Hackers:
hacker ethic includes, among others, the following two maxims:
(1) all information should be free;
(2) mistrust authority and promote decentralization.
+
Assange’s philosophy can’t be characterized in terms of left versus right so much as individual versus institution.
In particular, Assange holds that truth, creativity, etc. are corrupted by institutional hierarchies,
or what he calls “patronage networks,” and that much of illegitimate power is perpetuated by the hoarding of information.

; staff
6 fulltime volunteers + 1000 parttime encryption experts
1/10: 5 fulltime + 800 occassionaly, all volunteering
/ medzi nimi musi byt aka dovera!!!
As of June 2009, the site had over 1,200 registered volunteers[5] and listed an advisory board comprising Assange, Phillip Adams, Wang Dan, C. J. Hinke, Ben Laurie, Tashi Namgyal Khamsitsang, Xiao Qiang, Chico Whitaker and Wang Youcai.
ludia okolo nich: dissidents, journalists, mathematicians, startup company technologists, refugee representatives, ethics and anti-corruption campaigners (former TI head), human rights campaigners, lawyers, cryptographers
Dan, CN, 69 pi 9 ix, najhladanejsi po Tiananmen protestoch 89
Laurie, co-founder of apache, member of openssl, director of open rights group, etc, UK, works with Google London on their projects (security protocol pre html/javascript/css)
Phillip Adams, AU, 39 cn 11 ahau, v teenagi clen comm strany, broadcaster
Xiao Qiang, CN, editor China Digital Times
Whitaker, BR, social justice advocate
Wang Youcai, CN, 66 cn 12 ik, jeden z Tiananmen 89 protest lidrov, v 98 co-founded Dem Party (zakazana), 98-04 sedel v base a po tlaku US pusteny
WikiLeaks does not pay for lawyers, as hundreds of thousands of dollars in legal support have been donated by media organisations such as the Associated Press, The Los Angeles Times, and the National Newspaper Publishers Association.
?! WikiLeaks is planning to add an auction model to sell early access to documents.

; hosting
Pirate Party im v 8/10 ponukla hosting vo svedsku, napr v nato cyberbunkri; dostali DDOS, odisli na amazon; ten ich zrusil; odisli na OVH vo FR
Wikileaks integrates technologies including modified versions of MediaWiki, OpenSSL, FreeNet, Tor, PGP and software of our own design.
http://web.archive.org/web/20080216000537/http://www.wikileaks.org/wiki/Wikileaks:About#What_is_Wikileaks.3F_How_does_Wikileaks_operate.3F
ad Freenet – funguje inak ako torrent, je p2p siet, ale casti dat su po uploade (publisher moze byt potom uplne odpojeny, ako pri torrente) zakryptovane, anonymne rozdistribuovane po hostoch (redundantne), nikto nema cely file, takze nikto nie je zodpovedny za obsah ako celok (ako na torrente, a tiez neni problem s lack of ‘seeds’).
ale problem – Freenet tends to ‘forget’ data which is not retrieved regularly.
While users can insert data into the network, there is no way to delete data. Due to the anonymity, no node knows who is the ‘owner’ of a piece of data. The only way data can be removed is if users don’t request the data.
A data haven is a computer or a network that holds data protected from government action by both technical means (encryption) and location in a country that has either no laws, or poorly-enforced laws restricting use of data and no extradition treaties. HavenCo (centralized) andFreenet (decentralized) are two models of modern-day data havens.
WikiLeaks strongly encouraged postings via Tor because of the strong privacy needs of its users.
bulletproof hosting = WL keeps no logs and uses military-grade encryption to protect sources and other confidential information.
/ na SK to mala hysteria, medzi hekermi default hosting

According to Assange, Switzerland and Iceland are the only countries where WikiLeaks would feel safe to operate.
+ uvazuje o azyle v CH

Author and journalist Whitley Strieber: “Leaking a government document can mean jail, but jail sentences for this can be fairly short. However, there are many places where it means long incarceration or even death, such as China and parts of Africa and the Middle East.”[32]
http://www.freemarketnews.com/WorldNews.asp?nid=31640

; economy & aukcie
1/10:
core team sa vie samofinancovat, assange zarobil na nete. How do you and the other four guys who work full time without salaries finance living costs? I have made money in the Internet. So I have enough money to do that, but also not forever. And the other four guys, in the moment they are also able to self-finance.
donations = 10%, ostatne od journalist/tech/lawyers friends. In the moment most of the money comes from the journalists, the lawyers or the technologists who are personally involved. Only about ten percent are from online donations. But that might increase.
za pravnikov nikdy neplatili, vsetky spory vyhrali. We don’t have to pay for our lawyer’s time. Hundred of thousands or millions dollars’ worth of lawyer time are being donated. But we still have to pay things like photocopying and court filing. And so far we have never lost a case, there were no penalties or compensations to pay.
pravnikov maju od AP, LA Times, NNA. At the bottom of the site is a list of your “steadfast supporters”, media organisations and companies like AP, Los Angeles Times or The National Newspaper Association. What do they do for you? They give their lawyers, not cash.
nema problem s platenim ich zdrojov – preco by mali profitovat len novinari a pravnici? (by to riesili napr cez belgicko, ktore chrani media zdroje, vratane bank) Actually we would have no problem giving sources cash. We don’t do that, but for me there is no reason why only the lawyers and the journalists should be compensated for their effort.
the more evidence there is of some scandal and the more important the scandal, the less likely it is that the press will write about it. If there is no exclusivity.
aukcna nocna mora vo venezuele
(hovori o tom ako si mozu byt wl isti ze dane medium o tej story napise)
If you have an auction and a media organisation pays the most, then they are predicting, that they will benefit the most from publishing the story. That is, they will have the maximum number of readers. So this is a very good way to measure who should have the exclusivity. We tried to do it as an experiment in Venezuela .
Why Venezuela?
Because of the character of the document. We had 7 000 e-mails from Freddy Balzan, he was Hugo Chavez’s former speech writer and also the former ambassador to Argentinia. We knew that this document would have this problem, that it was big and political important, therefore probably no one would write anything about it for the reason I just said.
What happened?
This auction proved to be a logistical nightmare. Media organisations wanted access to the material before they went to auction. Consequently we would get them to sign non-disclosure agreements, chop up the material and release just every second page or every second sentence.That proved to distracting to all the normal work we were doing, so that we said, forget it, we can’t do that. We just released the material as normal. And that’s precisely what happened: no one wrote anything at all about those 7 000 Emails. Even though 15 stories had appeared about the fact that we were holding the auction.
You plan to continue the auction idea in the future …
We would actually need a team of five or six people whose job was just to arrange these auctions.
We plan to continue it, but we know it will take more resources. But if we pursue that we will not do that for single documents. We will instead offer a subscription. This would be much simpler. We would only have the overhead of doing the auction stuff every three months or six months, and not for every document.
+
15:19 < barak> hmm, tak mame to tu, cryptome’s john young’s hatred kampan o tom
ze wl su knowledge industry banda ma zazemie
15:20 < barak> akurat to je trochu ploche tvrdenie
15:21 < barak> wl sa obhajuju tym, ze tym media prinutia o storke nakoniec
napisat
15:21 < ach> to je tiez trochu ploche tvrdenie :)
15:21 < barak> prve si kupi exkluzivny early access
15:22 < barak> a ked nenapise, vyhodilo zbytocne peniaze
15:22 < barak> co ma ale vela slabin
15:22 < barak> takato logika
15:22 < ach> ved vravim
15:22 < ach> to je podla mna skor chaba racionalizacia
15:22 < ach> ako realny plan :)
15:23 < barak> ktovie ci to riesili pri cablegate. tvrdia ze nie. ak nie,
podarilo sa im vytvorit model kedy msg gets delivered
15:23 < barak> bez nutnosti aukcie
15:24 < barak> zaroven ohlasili ze stransparentnia svoj cashflow
+
este k aukcnemu modelu:
So the exclusivity of the story will run out after three months?
No, there will be exclusivity in terms of different time windows in access to the material. As an example: there will be an auction for North America. And you will be ranked in the auction. The media organisation which bids most in the auction would get access to it first, the one who bids second will get access to it second and so on. Media organisations would have a subscription to Wikileaks.
Let’s imagine there are only two companies in the auction. And one pays double what the other one pays. And let’s say the source says they want the document to be published in one month’s time. So there is a one month window where the journalists have time to investigate and write about the material. The organisation that pays the most for it gets it immediately, so therefore they would be able to do a more comprehensive story. Then the organisation that pays half as much gets it half the time later, they get the documents two weeks later. And then after one month they both publish.
But all in all I think we only would have to have a few bid cases per year, that would be enough to finance it.
15:31 < barak> rozhovor robili v case ked bol wl myslim dokonca dole, alebo
siel dole [ano, potvrdene v prvej otazke rozhovoru]. vzapati ale zacali chodit donations ake predtym
nechodili. co asi teoreticky vyriesilo problem pokrytia
operational costs
^ http://stefanmey.wordpress.com/2010/01/04/leak-o-nomy-the-economy-of-wikileaks/

; wl – knowledge that + how (via epistemology)
diplomaticke kable a dalsie leaky, skratka wikileaks nam davaju nielen truths, ale aj knowledge how..
vela veci boli doteraz beliefs, no povrdili sa, a stali sa poznanim.
wikileaks mali pred 2010 problem vytvorit mesidzom impact lebo ponukali iba truth… neponukali belief… (??)
no poznanie potrebuje byt okrem pravdou aj vierou, ludia mu musia verit. (??)
no a vdaka pritomnosti v mienkotvornych mediach nabrali aj belief value. a stali sa poznanim.
guardian outsourcol pravdu na wikileaks, wikileaks zase vieru na guardian (??)
?? nie je ale viera moc klasicke vnimanie poznania?
+
druhu vec ktoru nam wl davaju je ‘poznanie ako’ (via foucault). vieme o tom ze al-dzazira je relativne nezavisla telka,
dnes vieme aj to, ze scasti zavisla je, a aj ako. je kontrolovana katarskou vladou.
+
a acquaintance-knowledge?

; text-based impact
zarazajuce je ze spravili taky impact cisto s texom….
video je silnejsie – na tom zas stal collateral murder (tu redefinovali vyznam pojmu ‘collateral damage’).
tymto sa spustila lavina zaujmu. ich znacka vyrazne profitovala.

; internetovy technokomunista
/ komentar na zunguzungu (clanok wikileaks now) ze nechape preco nevie autor spravit link medzi manifestom a ich dnesnou taktikou.
his ideology is concocted generally from the readily available ideology of Internet technocommunism.
? There isn’t anything “capitalistic” or “market-oriented” or “libertarian” about what he says, as capitalism isn’t “better” if its trade secrets are destroyed, just like government didn’t get “better” by having its cables exposed.
/ ==>> takze mu je ukradnuty trh aj kapitalizmus aj stat ktory zavisi na obchodnych tajomstvach??
he isn’t for transparency so much as “justice”. “Justice” is Bolshevism — it’s justice as he sees, with code as law, and the coder as the most powerful. The hacker runs everything…because he *can*.
That’s *his* justice, which isn’t even frontier justice, but the Bolshevik “revolutionary expediency”.
it’s all destructive, to make a situation of “the worse, the better,” so that he can proclaim victory of the web over old organic institutions.
Wikileaks, Now
== oh no! alebo mysli to ironicky? term that in fact Kevin Kelly of Wired and AJ Keen have used in describing the phenomenon of Web 2.0 quite apart from me.
tiez: “Free” to 4-chan to the TED cult to Tim O’Reilly
transhumanist/singularist/technoutopian/whatever ideas bound up in software production
rightwing kritika z pozicie: “code-as-law” is a threat to human rights, not a realization or an improvement of them / ale nepisal o tom aj Lessig?
WikiLeaks is Bolshevism. It’s not about reform or about some noble advocacy. It’s about nihilistic destruction.
ad scientific journalism – As if an “original document” is somehow “scientific”. As if any of these cables can really be understood, shorn of their context.
http://3dblogger.typepad.com/wired_state/2010/12/christopher-schwartz-censors-my-comment-about-wikileaks-.html
/ ako ju vyvratit? neni wl fakt net technokomunizmus?
/ pojem pravdy u assange – tym trpim.. by som potreboval nastudovat foucaulta a uz nevladzem
Lovink&Riemens: wl is deeply shaped by 1980s hacker culture, combined with the political values of techno-libertarianism that emerged in the 1990s.
this brand of idealism (or, if you prefer, anarchism) is paired with a preference for conspiracies, an elitist attitude and a cult of secrecy (never mind condescension).
This is not conducive to collaboration with like-minded people and groups, who are relegated to being the simple consumers of WikiLeaks output.
The missionary zeal to enlighten the idiotic masses and “expose” the lies of government, the military and corporations is reminiscent of the well-known (or infamous) media-culture paradigm from the 1950s.
http://networkcultures.org/wpmu/geert/2010/12/07/twelve-theses-on-wikileaks-with-patrice-riemens/

; centralised group + wl as conspirators too
Assange, as the original designer of WikiLeaks, envisions this entity as a conspiracy to fight conspiracies.
+
Isn’t it strange that in Assange’s view, the decentralized acephalic network as the structure of authoritarianism? Almost as if the positions have been reversed. Not only is he philosophically not a hacker, for him the problem is effectively that government is controlled by hackers.
Daniel Domscheit-Berg, another former member who left recently, seems to endorse the standard anarchist view in interviews. This might mean that Assange is partly acting pragmatically – trying out ideas like crowdsourcing and then discarding them when they fail – but the failures also cause him to hew closer to his own principles, and this means jettisoning members who fail to adapt.
If Assange logic/ratuonality is moving to a hacker based logic/rationality to an “institutional” media one, this implies that sooner or later Wikileaks will be affected by a Secrecy/Conspirative/Authoritarian logic/rationality.
the danger for Wikileaks and assange is to be devoured by the Monster they are fighting for.
koment zo zunguzungu

; journalism
Lovink & Riemens: Assange and his collaborators refuse to be labelled in terms of “old categories” (journalists, hackers, etc.) and claim to represent a new Gestalt on the world information stage.
Traditional investigative journalism used to consist of three phases: unearthing facts, crosschecking these and backgrounding them into an understandable discourse. WikiLeaks does the first, claims to do the second, but omits the third completely.

; ANONYMOUS
*2006 Habbo raid (niektori oznacuju 2003-2007 ako zlatu eru 4chan)
sli proti cenzure, scientologom, teraz aj za free speech
“loose coalition of Internet denizens”
“doing it for the lulz”
[Anonymous is] the first internet-based superconsciousness. Anonymous is a group, in the sense that a flock of birds is a group. How do you know they’re a group? Because they’re travelling in the same direction. At any given moment, more birds could join, leave, peel off in another direction entirely.
—Landers, Chris, Baltimore City Paper, April 2, 2008.
Operation:Payback
In 2010, several Bollywood companies hired Aiplex Software to launch DDoS attacks on websites that did not respond to software takedown notices.[71] Piracy activists then created Operation Payback in September 2010 in retaliation.[71] The original plan was to attack Aiplex Software directly, but upon finding some hours before the planned DDoS that another individual had taken down the firm’s website on their own, Operation Payback moved to launching attacks against the websites of copyright stringent organisations, Law firms and other websites.[72] This grew into multiple DDoS attacks against anti-piracy groups and law firms.
shifted to wikileaks
utoky na:
– paypalblog.com
– paypal.com – frozen 60k eur
– Operation:Payback – postfinance.ch, which frozen 31k eur
– related to 4chan, 711chan, ED, irc channels, youtube, etc… predtym scientology, etc

Hlina 70 li 1 caban VIII lipt.mikulas, občiansky aktivista a podnikateľ, ako nezávislý.
Vasaryova 48 vi 13 oc VII, Poslankyňa Bratislavského samosprávneho kraja, za stredopravú koalíciu SDKÚ, SaS, KDH, Most-Híd a OKS
Ftacnik 56 sc 8 men XIII, Úradujúci starosta Petržalky, ako nezávislý, s podporou Smeru
Budaj 52 aq 2 ben* V, mestský poslanec, za BA koalíciu Zmena zdola, Demokratickú úniu a Demokratickú stranu
/ moderuje blascak 1 oc IX (debata @a4 zajtra)

the response has been a mixture of equanimity and stunned silence. In Sweden, by comparison, thousands of people took to the streets when the first far-right MPs were elected that same month.
Wilders (PVV) has agreed to lend his support in parliament to a minority government of conservative Liberals (PVV) and the smaller Christian Democrats (CDA) + in return: freedom to pursue many of his favorite policy projects, including anti-immigrant measures and several openly anti-Muslim initiatives, including a burqa ban and closer monitoring of Islamic schools.
Even though PVV will not take ministerial responsibility, the coalition does depend on his support for its survival and has signed a formal agreement to that extent.
Denmark has had a similar construction in place since 2001, but its right-wing People’s Party is almost moderate compared with Wilders’ Party for Freedom.
The party’s platform calls Islam “mostly a political ideology” and wishes to deny it any of the considerations afforded a religion in the Netherlands.
Wilders: Prophet Mohammed is a “barbarian and a pedophile.”
“They are trying to hide his role, but it is clear that he is part of this government, whether he has a seat in it or not,” says Mariko Peters (GreenLeft).
Wilders sometimes makes the likes of Fox News host Glenn Beck, anti-Muslim blogger Pamela Geller, and even the most extreme fringes of the Tea Party crowd look like moderates.
Several Dutch media outlets have delved into ideological and financial ties between Wilders and American archconservatives such as David Horowitz, Daniel Pipes, and Jim DeMint.
Just as opponents of the Park51 project have accused its imam, Faisal Abdul Rauf, of radicalism, Wilders has tried to link the people behind a mosque that he opposes, Rotterdam’s Essalam mosque, to Islamic extremism. He suggested in parliamentary questions this January that the main donor for the mosque’s construction, Dubai’s Crown Prince Hamdan bin Rashid Al-Maktoum, could have ties to Afghanistan’s Taliban.
He has called for a “head rag tax” on women wearing headscarves. He favors banning the Quran, wants to close Muslim schools but not equivalent Christian or Jewish ones, wants to force immigrants to sign “assimilation contracts,” and wants to include the “Judeo-Christian character” of the state in the constitution.
Pijpers says that Wilders has more in common with the Tea Party activists in the United States than with any old-style European right-wing party, because he can’t really be classified as either right-wing or left-wing.
His party has also embraced a left-wing populist defense of the Netherlands’ besieged welfare system, and he scores points with his tough stance against crime, which he often links to immigrants.
His outspokenness has made him a hated figure for some Muslims, and he lives under constant police protection. Recently, an Australian imam called for his beheading, the last in a long line of threats. Wilders himself argued in July on the website muslimsdebate.com that he does not hate Muslims — he just opposes Islam and wants Muslims to liberate themselves from its shackles. Strikingly, he seems to have formed his low opinion of Arab and Muslim societies at a young age when he visited both Israel and Egypt and contracted a stomach bug in the latter.
In July, Wilders announced that he was setting up a Geert Wilders International Freedom Alliance aimed at stopping Muslim immigration to the West. He designated the United States as one of five countries that were “ripe” for his alliance, and he may have had this confirmed at the 9/11 rally in New York. Says Golyardi, “He sees that there are people who agree with him all over the world, and he wants to provide an umbrella for them, to found an anti-Islam international.”
Earlier, Wilders had even appealed to mainstream opinion in the United States and Europe by opposing the planned burning of the Quran in Florida, even though he has compared the Quran to Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf.
assertions by some Dutch politicians and analysts that once Wilders has been co-opted into the system, as he now is, his sharp edges will be blunted.
The mildness detected in his New York speech was at the time taken as a green light for the other parties to proceed with the talks and eventually reach an agreement with him.

theo van gogh 57.7.23 le 1 imix* I
His great-grandfather was art dealer Theo van Gogh, brother of Vincent van Gogh.
2003 book Allah Knows Best – in his typical cynical, mocking tone – presented his views on Islam.

ayaan hirsi ali 67.11.13 sc 7 kan+
naturalized refugee, from the ex-royal family of Somalia

Together with Hirsi Ali, van Gogh created the 10-minute movie Submission. The film is about violence against women in Islamic societies, and focuses especially on female circumcision. It shows four abused women, naked under see-through dresses with Qur’anic verses in Arabic unfavourable to women, painted on their bodies. After the movie was released, both van Gogh and Hirsi Ali received death threats. Van Gogh did not take these very seriously and refused any protection.
http://www.ifilm.com/ifilmdetail/2655656?htv=12

2004.11.2 van Gogh was shot with seven bullets and died on the spot. His throat was slit, and he was then stabbed in the chest. Two knives were left inplanted in his torso, one pinning a 5 page note to his body. The note threatened Western governments, Jews and Hirsi Ali (who went into hiding). The note also contains references to the ideologies of the Egyptian organization Takfir wal-Hijra. The alleged killer Mohammed Bouyeri, a 26-year-old man of Dutch and Moroccan nationalities, was apprehended by the police after being shot in the leg.
Though Bouyeri’s parents were from Morocco, he was raised in The Netherlands in Dutch and apparently did not know Arabic. The letter had nothing on Van Gogh. It was a long ramble on purported quotes from the Jewish Talmud. The suspect was said to be upset by his mother’s death and TV footage of US soldiers killing wounded Iraqi civilians. There is not any proof that he did not act alone. So, an INDIVIDUAL killed Van Gogh. Not “Islam”. Not even “political Islam.”
http://indymedia.nl/nl/2004/11/22690.shtml

Until his death Van Gogh was working on a movie (0605) about the assassination of Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn.

Pim Fortuyn 48.2.19 7 ik.
Openly gay publicist; hostile views on Islam and his anti-immigration positions; could perhaps be described as a nationalist, but on cultural rather than racial grounds; held libertine views, favoring the drug policy of the Netherlands, same-sex marriage, euthanasia on request and related positions; wanted to disband the army and air force, retaining only a navy.
2001: “I am also in favour of a cold war with Islam. I see Islam as an extraordinary threat, as a hostile society.”
2002: Netherlands, with a population of 16 million, had enough inhabitants, and therefore, the practice of allowing 40,000 asylum-seekers into the country each year had to be stopped.
2002: “I don’t hate Islam. I consider it a backwards* culture. I have travelled much in the world. And wherever Islam rules, it’s terrible. All the hypocrisy. It’s a bit like those old Reformed Protestants. The Reformed lie all the time. And why is that? Because they have norms and values that are so high that you can’t humanly maintain them. You also see that in Muslim culture. Look at the Netherlands. In what country could a leader of such a large movement as mine be openly homosexual? It’s fantastic that it’s possible. That’s something that we can be proud of. And I want to keep it that way.”
In 2002 assassinated by an animal rights left-wing activist. After consultation with the Lijst Pim Fortuyn, it was decided not to postpone the elections. However, it was not possible under Netherlands law to modify the candidate lists, so Fortuyn became a posthumous candidate. Lijst Pim Fortuyn went on to record an unprecedented debut in the lower house of parliament, winning 26 seats (17% of the total 150 seats).

volby bratislavskeho samospravneho kraja, 26.11.2005

xychty (najvyssie sance):
roman (44 ar 3 ix V, sdku+ano+smk+ds+szs, preds BA samospravneho kraja), bajan (60 li 2 cauac VI, smer+sf+hzd)

lavica:
dvorak (75 li 10 ahau+, ol.sk, obcianski liberali, lib, inak neznamy)

pravica:
tatar (53 vi 7 oc*, oks.sk, konzervativec, old skool VPN), svejna (65, vpred.sk, liberal, hayekov institut, hardcore dochodkova reforma)

psychiatria:
cuper (46 sa 11 chuen I, hzds+sns, jedno male pivko hik), ondrias (52 ar 11 imix VIII, kss), trnovec (63 cn 3 imix V, hsls.sk, ludovci sieg), martancik (usvit, tiez komunista) a mokran (Kres

velke strany nemaju vela miesta na manevrovanie a ciselna a abstraktna politika je odsudena na populizmus
a flexibilnu navigaciu v chaotickom prostredi; v principe je sucastou europskeho samoregulujuceho sa mechanizmu, takze tam ide v podstate o fazulky.
what matters su minority – romovia, narodnostne mensiny (ukrajinci, vietnamci, cinania; nie madari, tych je vela a zle sa mat nebudu), imigranti (slovensko prijima zalostne malo ludi), bezdomovci a socialne slabi,
nabozenske mensiny (moslimi).
velke strany sa tymto temam spravidla vyhybaju, male nemaju skusenosti a vo velkej politike ambicie osekavaju pripadne sa ich uplne vzdaju v pude sebazachovy.
politicke strany ich v podstate nepriznane outsourcuju do tretieho sektora.
takze paradoxne meciar urobil pre slovensko plus ked zaviedol 2%.
? ktore strany dnes hovoria o podpore a vyzname tretieho sektora?
dalej ekologia, kultura a skolstvo…… vsetko minoritne temy. (za dzurindu boli granty lepsie ako za socialistov…)
ako zivnostnika mi rovna dan priniesla vyrazne ulahcenie uctovnictva (vacsim podnikatelom a investorom
zvonka stransparentnenie ekonomie podnikania)
+
ministri kultury – ktore vlady mali ake vysledky?
zivnostnici – co nove nam dali ktore vlady? dzurinda rovnu dan
treti sektor – meciar 2%
+
[10:54:18 AM] dirtyintunel: no,to je jedno, ja pojdem volit takzvane mensie zlo:)a z principu by som nebola schopna neist volit
[10:54:23 AM] dirtyintunel: ale to je jedno
[10:54:36 AM] dusanson: nj
[10:54:44 AM] dusanson: ja som zvazoval pragmaticky pristup
[10:56:12 AM] dusanson: ale v konecnom dosledku nevidim rozdiel zasadny
[10:58:50 AM] dirtyintunel: no, ja myslim ze mat vo vlade extremnych nacionalistov napriklad a mat vo vlade pravicovu vladu je celkom rozdiel.aj ked samozrejme, kazdy si moze povedat ze vsetci su rovnake svine
[10:59:21 AM] dirtyintunel: no, tak sa teda asi minieme.
[11:00:10 AM] dirtyintunel: ja budem v ba asi len par dni: pondelok, utorok, stredu rano nejak vyrazim späť aby som stihla byt o stvrtej vo fra
[11:03:54 AM] dusanson: veci ktore pre mna politicky maju zmysel – kvalitne skolstvo, nezavislu kulturu, romov, narodnostne mensiny, imigrantov, socialne vylucenych – outsourcuju strany ktore by som potencialne volil na bedra neziskoviek, ktore ale ledva prezivaju – nenasiel som ziadnu stranu ktora by mala priority rozvoj tretieho sektora, skolstvo, kulturu a ekologiu… ostatne veci sa uz samoreguluju v ramci toho ze SK je integrovane do EU
[11:07:07 AM] dusanson: chybaju mi na slovensku zeleni, ktori boli v cechach na vrchole pred 4 rokmi
[11:07:46 AM] dusanson: + som laviciar, nech uz to v postkomunistickych realiach vyznieva hocako
[11:35:58 AM] dirtyintunel: ja som tiez laviciar a aj tak nedam proste hlas smeru, lebo to pre mna nie je lavica
[11:36:22 AM] dirtyintunel: radsej budem volit pravicu nez mu dat hlas tym ze volit vobec nepojdem
[11:37:01 AM] dirtyintunel: a este som si neprecitala vsetky volebne programy ale vyberiem si podla toho co mi bude pripadat ze ma asi najvacsi zmysel.
[11:38:33 AM] dusanson: ja ak by som volil tak most, ale pride mi dost necitatelny
[11:39:29 AM] dirtyintunel: zelenych nemame to je fakt, a ktovie kedy mat budeme.ale zatial proste budem volit to co je sice nedokonale ale aspon nie uplne za ramcom nejakej slusnosti: napriklad ked chces podporu pre romov a neziskovky,tak ti mozem povedat ze neziskovky sa maju teraz tisic krat horsie nez sa mali v dobe sdku.tym nevravim ze idem volit sdku, ale rozhodne nechcem nechat prepadnut svoj hlas smeru
[11:42:10 AM] dirtyintunel: takmer vsetky dlhodobejsie projekty rozvojovej pomoci boli narusene a vlastne tym znicene odkedy su strany smer a sns pri moci.a proste ked mam moznost ich odtial dostat,tak to proste spravim aj za cenu toho ze nemozem volit stranu ktora by sa mi fakt ze pacila
[11:42:50 AM] dirtyintunel: alebo sa o to aspon pokusim
[11:43:02 AM] dirtyintunel: lebo je mozne ze to aj tak vyhraju
[11:43:36 AM] dirtyintunel: ale fakt tomu nebudem prispievat tym ze nepojdem volit.ale to je moj nazor.mozno sa mylim
[11:44:09 AM] dusanson: ake su preferencie teraz
[11:44:11 AM] dusanson: ?
[11:44:35 AM] dirtyintunel: netusim, budem sa tym zaoberat vo fra, tam mam na taketo veci cas popri praci:)
[11:44:44 AM] dirtyintunel: teraz musim pisat
[11:45:08 AM] dusanson: pozeram , ze pises jak gonzales )
[11:45:14 AM] dirtyintunel: ale volit proste urcite pojdem, nech by boli akekolvek.a nemam rada taky ten nazor ze : ved to je aj tak jedno.
[11:45:59 AM] dusanson: jaka debata zrazu
[11:46:03 AM] dirtyintunel: mam uz fakt radsej strajkujucich francuzov kazdy utorok a stvrtok nez mamvpicistickych slovakov co nedojdu na demosku lebo prsalo :)
[11:46:04 AM] dusanson: ja tu cvicim popritom
[11:46:27 AM] dirtyintunel: heh, sory.uz som ticho.
[11:49:05 AM] dusanson: hh, sdku chyba este par desatin percent a mozu zrobit koaliciu so smerom
[11:49:25 AM] dirtyintunel: tak to je celkom smrt
[11:49:31 AM] dusanson: pod to neviem ci sa chcem podpisovat
[11:49:31 AM] dirtyintunel: taka koalicia
[11:50:00 AM] dusanson: myslim ze pragmaticky pristup mal zmysel proti meciarovi
[11:50:07 AM] dusanson: ze laviciari volili pravicu atd
[11:50:23 AM] dusanson: pred 8 rokmi
[11:50:23 AM] dirtyintunel: no, tak ako hovoria vsakovake ceske protikampane a kampane, strc hlavu do piesku :)
[11:50:27 AM] dusanson: teraz je situacia ina, sme v eu
[11:50:35 AM] dusanson: to neni piesok, vobec nie
[11:50:36 AM] dirtyintunel: hej, takze mozme mat v pici
[11:50:55 AM] dusanson: politika neni o tom ze raz za 4 roky idem k urne a mam to vybavene
[11:50:56 AM] dirtyintunel: nie, tu nejde o to volit sdku.ja ich asi vobec volit nebudem
[11:51:03 AM] dirtyintunel: no jasne ze neni
[11:51:34 AM] dusanson: keby som mal v pici tak to ani nerieism
[11:51:43 AM] dirtyintunel: ale vtedy mozes prispiet tomu ze sa tam napriklad nedostane strana ktoru tvoje osobne postoje odmietaju
[11:53:14 AM] dusanson: ja v tomto proste nechcem byt chladny pragmatik ktory sa preda za male dobro ktore aj tak neni iste
[11:54:00 AM] dirtyintunel: hm, a ja to zas beriem tak, ze asi treba robit male kroky k tomu aby sa raz z toho maleho dobra stalo “velke dobro”
[11:54:23 AM] dirtyintunel: a myslim si ze pokial bude pri moci smer a sns tak sa to asi moc nestane
[11:55:15 AM] dusanson: ja to tak nemam
[11:55:21 AM] dirtyintunel: a hlavne mat nacionalisticku vladu popri madarskej nacionalistickej vlade mi vobec nepride ze je dobre.
[11:55:25 AM] dusanson: tak sa mozeme bavit teraz veky vekuce )
[11:56:12 AM] dusanson: male kroky sa robia v tretom sektore
[11:57:08 AM] dusanson: a to som este dost umierneni
[11:57:18 AM] dusanson: par kamosov anarchistov su uplne proti statu
[11:59:15 AM] dirtyintunel: no,dusan,aj ja mam kamosov anarchistov ale to beriem uz kusok ako extrem ktory neviem ako dlho by medzi ludmi fungoval.ja citim v poslednej dobe z ludi len zvysenu agresiu, zvysene dusno, celkovu nervozitu a deziluzie, skepsu, paranoju atd.anarchia by to mozno uvolnila na chvilu ale neviem ci vyriesila.
[12:00:27 PM] dusanson: ono je to dost zlozitejsie, pri anarchii nejde o ‘konecne riesenie’
[12:00:31 PM] dusanson: ale musim het teraz
[12:00:40 PM] dirtyintunel: ved vpoho, ale aj tak..
[12:01:40 PM] dirtyintunel: netusim, ci by to nieco vyriesilo. aj ked si myslim ze demokraticky system tak ako teraz funguje sa mi tiez nepaci:)
[12:03:16 PM] dirtyintunel: ale aj tak proste nedam a nedam a nedam hlas proste snsakom.a ani smeru.proste nedam, lebo su pre mna veci co robili nechutne, a ich prezentacia este horsia..
+
politicky subjekt – raz za styri roky odvolit a potom sa stiahnut naspat do pozicie observera
+
For liberals, not voting is equivalent to not acting, and political action is synonymous with voting.
+
a non-vote often just ends up as a vote for whoever can be bothered to turn up at the polls.
+
if over half the country refused to take part in the game, then at least the government can no longer claim that it represents the people.
+
‘voting against’ rather than for (to ja [zatial] nazyvam pragmatizmom)
+
more responsible to say ‘no’, than to remain silent
+
we should have a ‘none of the above’ option on the ballot.
+
ranciere – disagreement (1999) – chapter: democracy and consensus (o postdemokracii)
Much of this critique is directed at proponents of consensus democracy, to which Rancière has two main objections: first, that these societies relentlessly produce individuals and groups that take no part in the system of politics by consensus; and second, that democracies produce communities that are configured in such a way that individuals are counted according to ethnic or national identities rather than political potential.
~ holmes:
In Disagreement (published originally in 1995), he confronted the philosophy of government with the scandal of the political.1 Government fulfills an

ideal of order when it administers, manages, and tries to totally account for a population; but its reality is the police. The police keeps everyone in their place, imposes the calculations of value, apportions out the shares in society.
The political is an opposite process, and it is rare. It happens when outcasts stand up to say that the calculations are wrong, when they refuse the names and the places they’ve been given (we’re not a surplus), to claim both a share in society and another name, which will signify their particular

addition to universal equality (we’re a plus).
..
Equality is the groundless claim of a minority to have the rights of any other group, to be the demos, the people.
..
In an essay written just after Disagreement, Rancière explained that the political always involves a disidentification with some aspect of the existing community—for example, with the police state that expels the jobless or the paperless. At the same time, it requires an impossible identification with “the cause of the other.”2 This impossible identification suggests a new, subjective figure of political commitment.
(napr FR lavica sa postavila na stranu vzburenych alzircanov ktorych hodila FR policia do Seiny v 1961;
alebo studenti 68: we are all german jews;
?adoptovanie paperless cloveka? – @late 90s, with the public act, often performed in theaters, of parrainage or “god-parenting,” which meant taking a quasi-familial, quasi-legal responsibility for an undocumented individual;
@SK – na stranu romov, na stranu LGBT pri gay pride)
+
Miroslav Hudak 15 – SDKU (Zitnanska, Jurzyca, Beblavy, Novotny)
Miroslav Hudak — zistenia — vyse 32 tisic popletenych neonackov — vyse 124 tisic nezmyselnych nacionalistov na jednej a vyse 105 tisic na druhej

strane — 848 tisic ludi neschopnych mysliet v suvislostiach — okolo 14 tisic ludi, ktori by automaticky mali stratit volebne pravo — risko drziaci

balonik — a ja a dalsich vyse milion…a ludi, ktori aspon kvoli vlade pravdepodobne nebudu uvazovat nad stahovanim sa do zahranicia…

europska demokraticka strana, unia, nova demokracia, azen

SMER=JOJ
dzurinda odstupil od kandidatky po tom co nanho fico vytiahol sponzorsky skandal

EDS
robi homogenicov otec, ex-hzds

ND

AZEN
azenu nikto nedal v prieskume focusu nikto hlas

UNIA
zahradnik s martinakovou

SDKU

—
62 smer
28 sdku
22 sas (4 ol)
15 kdh
14 most-hid
9 sns
http://volby.sme.sk/c/5421483/kto-bude-sediet-v-parlamente-pozrite-si-zoznam-poslancov.html

SDKU
Iveta Radicova (1/1)
Ivan Miklos (2/2)
Lucia Zitnanska (3/3)
Magdalena Vasaryova (4/23)
Milan Hort (5/4)
Ludovit Kanik (6/30)
Eugen Jurzyca (7/5)
Viliam Novotny (8/6)
Martin Fedor (9/7)
Jana Dubovcova (10/18)

SAS – liberali, *3/09
V prezidentských voľbách 2009 strana podporila kandidátku Ivetu Radičovú.
Richard Sulik (1/1) – 68 cp 2 kan* BA, sef, 80 emigroval do mnichova – stud. fyz & ekon, 91-01 *faxcopy, 03 *docent NHF EU,
03 diplomka ako predloha SK rovnej dane, poradca min.fin (miklos 02-03, pociatek 06-07), 04-06 sef OLO
Daniel Krajcer (2/5) 6 cauac 69 vi BA
Jozef Mihal (3/2) 12 ix 65 pi BA
Juraj Miskov (8/3)
Martin Chren (9/6)
Jana Kissova (10/4)
+
* 4x Obycajni ludia o.z. ~ konzervativnejsie kridlo
Igor Matovič, Erika Jurinová, Martin Fecko a Jozef Viskupič kandidovali na posledných štyroch miestach 150-člennej kandidátky SaS. Prednostné hlasy ich vyniesli hneď za trojicu lídrov SaS Richarda Sulíka, Daniela Krajcera a Jozefa Mihála.
„Nevieme sa stotožniť so zavedením registrovaných partnerstiev, s formou odluky cirkvi od štátu, ako to navrhuje SaS, a takisto s dekriminalizáciou marihuany.“
ich hlavným mottom bolo „Nevoliť, znamená voliť Slotu a Fica“.
=
Igor Matovic (4/150) 9 lamat ta 73 TT, http://matovic.blog.sme.sk/c/231181/Urobia-to-znova-500-svinstiev-pokope.html
Považujem sa za jedného z najväčších Ficobijcov
by som to definoval ako názorová platforma SaS.
Jozef Viskupic (7/147) 11 chuen aq 76 TT
Erika Jurinová (6/149) 2 oc* 71 vi dedina pri ZA
Martin Fecko (5/148) 5 chuen 62 li

MOST-HID
Bugar; Chmel
+
4x OKS

SK lavicovi intelektuali: Havran (73), Stefunko (77), Draxler
CZ: Belohradsky, Mecl

Ivan Stefunko 1977 – zaujimavy lavicovy politolog
*77 vych. SK; Ľavičiar z Mladej demokratickej ľavice, ktorá vznikla na pôde SDĽ; viedol týždenník Slovo; od 2000 žije v BA; euractiv.sk.
Ľavica je pre mňa základná platforma pre ozajstnú slobodu a demokraciu. Len človek, ktorý je skutočne nezávislý, môže byť slobodný a nebude utláčaný.
Žil som s rodičmi v Alžírsku a dva roky som strávil na francúzskej internátnej škole v hlavnom meste, kde som býval s viac ako 30 národnosťami – od Arabov, cez černochov, až po Vietnamcov. Mám iný pohľad na konflikt civilizácií, ako ho pomenoval Huntington. Poznal som veľa európskych chrapúňov a mnoho dobrých Arabov, čo neznamená, že v každom národe nie je nejaká negatívna vlastnosť. Navyše, francúzske vzdelávanie kladie dôraz na spoločensko-vednú výchovu a už v 15 rokoch ma ovplyvnili Zola, Sartre a Camus. A človek, čo žije v rozvojom svete, musí vnímať, že trh nevyrieši všetko a že nie všetky „kapitalistické” vzťahy a kroky sú fajn.

Michal Havran 1973, ed. lavicovy server jetotak.sk
vyštudoval protestantskú teológiu v Štrasburgu, je zakladateľom a šéfredaktorom portálu Jetotak.sk. Jedenásť rokov žil vo Francúzsku.
2007: Portál JeToTak.sk má obsahovo nadviazať na stránky e-politika.eu (do 2/07), odkiaľ prichádzajú aj kľúčoví autori.
* 3/07, Vydavateľstvo Mediage
Jeho editormi sú Ľubomír Lintner, Michal Havran a Jarmila Mikušová. Kotian a Havran pôsobili v minulosti v denníku SME či v týždenníku Domino Fórum, Ľubomír Lintner naposledy v TV Markíza, odkiaľ prostredníctvom strany ANO vstúpil do politiky.

Martin Filko, ekonom a publicista
ex-poradca ministra financií SR Jána Počiatka (od 1/08), odborný asistent na Ústave verejnej politiky FSEV UK, junior výskumník a PhD. študent ekonómie/vedy o behaviorálnej teórii rozhodovania na Erazmovej univerzite v Rotterdame.
magisterský titul v odbore klinická a organizačná psychológia na Univerzite Komenského v Bratislave, absolvoval EUBA, odbor medzinárodné ekonomické vzťahy.
V 2006 uverejnil časopis Trend jeho článok Bieda slovenskej ekonómie, v ktorom kritizoval kvalitu slovenského ekonomického vzdelávania (najmä EUBA), vedy a verejnej diskusie. Inicioval vznik skupinového blogu Radostná veda.

Juraj Draxler 1975
wannabe kriticky, zvasty, pragmatik, bez charizmy, refren: potreba kritickej diskusie
Momentálne žije v Prahe, kde píše, skúma a vyučuje. Občas dochádza do Londýna či do Bruselu (Centrum pre európske politické štúdie, CEPS), kde má ďalšie pracovné aktivity. A občas do anglického Lancasteru, kde si robí doktorát (nové teoretické prístupy k problematike sociálneho štátu).

Vyštudoval Medzinárodnú univerzitu (dnes Jacobs University) v Brémach a Univerzitu v Yorku. V minulosti pracoval napríklad ako asistent vedenia strojárskeho holdingu či ako novinár v britskej agentúre Reuters. Po rokoch strávených v Bruseli a na severe Anglicka chce žiť už len tam, kde je dosť slnka. + prednášateľ na českom pracovisku University of New York

networks (via Daxner):
right: INEKO, INESS (penta), Nadacia FA Hayeka, HPI (penta), Pontis.
left:
ASA (Smer, prispate)
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
Proforum (*Schmoegnerova)
Slovo (pozoviti intelektuali, reakcna lavica, od ~zac.2010 prebrali smeraci)
JeToTak (sa tam toci mladez)

http://nezavisli.blogspot.com/
(Nove) Slovo = lavica
Tyzden = neokon

pro interupcie (incl Stefunko)
http://moznostvolby.host.sk/

Belohradsky
Ve svém souèasném mediálním fungování antikomunismus úèinnì pøekrývá skuteèné hrozby – rychle rostoucí nerovnost, dopady globalizace, ekologickou krizi, ideologii bezohlednosti, jak ji pøedstavuje ODS, srùstání ekonomické, politické a mediální moci.
http://www.multiweb.cz/hawkmoon/od_realneho_k_realnemu.htm

SK bolo s cz v 1 state uz za rakuskeho cisarstva a potom za rak-uhorska.
Dual monarchia (867-18) sharovala armadu, fin a zahr. politiku.
R&U vytvorili alianciu s DE (1879) a IT (1882) aby vyvazili RU a FR mocnosti
1908 R&U anektovali bosnu&herz (okupovali ju od 1878 ako nasledok Great Balkan Crisis, ked R&U bolo neutralne ked sa rusko a turecko bili o srbsko, to nakoniec ziskalo nezavislost [Congress of Berlin]), ako spolocne vlastnictvo.
=> uvahy o CR+B&H ako tretej (slovanskej) casti monarchie, a Franz Ferdinand bol zastanca tohto trializmu, ktorym chcel obmedzit silu HU aristokracie => takze ho nemilovali v HU ani v srbsku (?!).
V 14 ho zavrazdili srbski nacionalisti v bosne (sarajevo).
Od 1878 [Congr of BLN] DE 5x zvysilo military costs, UK,RU,FR 3x, R&U ledva 2x.
1913 Srbsko ziskalo nove uzemia v Second Balkan War => obavy v R&U (ti stratili etnicky talianske uzemia).
Cast vlady chcela preventivnu vojnu so Srbskom, no 84yr vladca bol proti akymkolvek dobrodruzstvam.
No po atentate (vyuzili ako zamienku) vydala vlada backed by DE ally srbom July Ultimatum, ktore ratali ze srbi nikdy neakceptuju. => ti akceptovali 9, a iba cast 10teho, nasledne R&U vyhlasili vojnu => RU mobilizovala na podporu Srbska => domino reakcia dalsich protimobilizacii. IT najprv neutralna napriek aliancii, v 15 sa pridala na druhu stranu dufajuc ze ziska uzemia od byvalych spojencov.
konieckoncov bolo R&U vojenskym satelitom Nemecka
? okupacia SK madarskom v 1919?

Tabery & Šimečka pre Respekt

nejdůležitější výsledek voleb: 3 momenty: definitivní konec mečiarismu na Slovensku, neúspěch politiky rozeštvávání a nacionalismu a to, že středopravé strany sice nijak výrazně, ale přece jen získaly větší podporu než levicový populismus.
+
ficov meciarizmus:
Agendu mečiarismu ve velké míře převzal premiér Fico, a to v podobě silného vůdcovského principu a státního paternalismu. Projevuje se to i ve stylu politiky, neustálého vytváření třídního nepřítele, chápání demokracie jako nadvlády většiny, chápání politiky jen a jen jako moci. Politický marketing byl v jeho případě podstatnější než obsah politiky a byl založený na silných propagandistických heslech o spravedlnosti a sociálním státě. U Fica to není mečiarismus v ryzí podobě – jako byly únosy, vraždy, omezení svobody slova. Mečiarismus byl v tomto rozsahu hrozný a navíc byl spojený s divokou privatizací, která přivedla zemi na pokraj státního bankrotu. Tuto podobu Ficova politika nemá, tu bych charakterizovala jako vláčnější.
+
left / right:
bez přehánění říkám, že současné politické teorie jsou málo použitelné.
levicové a pravicové dělení je ve 21. století nefunkční. Jeho charakteristiky jsou definované pro průmyslovou společnost. my jsme informační společností. dnes už nejde použít ani definici sociálního státu pro 20. století.
Politika se dnes dělí hlavně na hodnotových principech vztahu svobody a zodpovědnosti. Tedy především na formu kolektivních práv versus občanská práva. Na politiku státního paternalismu versus politiku individuální občanské odpovědnosti.
+
grecko:
půjčka je jen iluze záchrany.
je tady MMF, přes který si poradilo Lotyšsko.
den po volbách vláda zveřejnila deficit financí 6,7 % HDP, což je velmi vysoké číslo. A já se obávám, že je ještě vyšší.
Slovensko je v situaci, kdy se musíme ptát, za kolik procent nám někdo dá půjčku na půjčku jiné zemi.
+
inspiro pre CZ:
jsme udrželi daňovou reformu. A musíme sice trochu opravit druhý pilíř důchodové reformy, ale to dokážeme velmi rychle. Máme dobře udělanou reformu veřejné správy, i když se musí dotáhnout do konce úprava kompetencí a finanční decentralizace, ale to nastartování se osvědčilo a je udělané poměrně kvalitně. A máme také dobře rozběhnutou rodinnou politiku.
+
priority:
Pokud vezmeme jako prvořadou justici, co je na řadě potom?
Školství, protože hlavní problém Slovenska je dnes tvorba nových pracovních míst. Máme obrovskou míru nezaměstnanosti absolventů škol, ovšem ne proto, že by slovenské děti a studenti byli nešikovní, ale protože máme obrovskou propast mezi tím, jaké kvalifikace nabízejí školy a jaké kvalifikace jsou skutečně potřeba na trhu práce. Jinak nás ale bezpochyby čekají tři dominantní úkoly: spravedlnost, reforma soudnictví a odstraňování korupce, to je jeden balík. Pak nastartování ekonomiky a tvorba nových pracovních míst, takže hospodářská politika. Přirozeně navazuje reforma školství. To jsou základní priority.

DENMARK
dialnice 110km max :(

Poul Gernes (he is in the Dokumenta in 2007?) and made the first comprehensive monograph on his work some years ago. He made his own school “eksperimantal art scool” in 1962. Poul Gernes was a hippie-ayatollah-painter and banned all galleries and decided only to paint public buildings and giant wall paintings in hospitals. He died in 1996. http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poul_Gernes

COPENHAGEN
wifi mhd busy; ludia cakali v bare oproti Props na drinky v rade (asi 6 ludi) ako v banke; greenland people @christiania
http://copenhagen.unlike.net

*** stvrte ***
Christiania @Christianhavn: Cafe Månefiskeren w/ wifi; Morgenstedet veggie place 60dkk/jedlo s dlhymi nazvami; Pusherstreet fight ~ 10 stands w/ pot & hash); <1000 ppl; special law status - Christiania Law of 1989 (cast spravy je prevedena z mesta na stat); po ww2 tam popravovali war criminals; *1971 at squatted military area (kasarne sa tam po ww2 skoro nepouzivali, ked odisli strazilo uzemie len par guardov, susedia sa vlamali cez plot kvoli ihriskam pre svoje deti, mesiac nato Jacob Ludvigsen a 5 dalsich vydali magazin s clankom o vyhlaseni free town -- "opportunity to build society from a scratch"); DK defence ministry still owns the land. Since 1994, residents have paid taxes and fees for water, electricity, trash disposal, etc. Pot/hash trade tolerated till 2004=koniec pusherstreet, potom conflicts okolo takingover skupinami zvonka a market sa rozsiril do celeho mesta, neskor zas navrat do normalu. 4/2005 vrazda 26yr a 3 zranenia pri gang assault [norrebro immigrants] @pusherstreet due to feud over cannabis market - chceli take over po tom co v 2004 skoncil open cannabis trade. 5/2007 riots proti policii (entered to demolish leftovers of the small, abandoned building of Cigarkassen) - vytlacili ich. Forbidden: stealing, violence, guns, knives, bulletproof vests, hard drugs and bikers' colors. Residents now pay the rent ~ 200 eur / mo (1450 dkk). ?! In 9/2007, the representatives of Christiania and CPH's city council reached an agreement to cede control of Christiania to the city over the course of 10 years for the purposes of business development. + * Norrebro (bars Props a oproti cez ulicu, & gentrif), Nordvest (Bispebjerg), Valby=new gallery area; Christianshaven, which was built by Dutch people in 1600s. They were invited here because they knew how to build on stilts. It was reclaimed land that had been pumped dry. * Orestad - newly developed area, glass facades ~ people live in shop windows * Amager island - 200-300 years ago DK brought in Dutch people to grow vegetables here. They supplied the city with fresh vegetables. cafes: http://copenhagen.unlike.net/proximity?location_id=301177#lat/55.687723/zoom/13/lng/12.559724/category/300071-Food Kunsthal Charlottenborg (*2007), largest contemp art exhib venue @DK, building built in the 1880s for the salon and for the (next door) art academy professors to exhibit their work. via Pod: cool cafes in center: http://www.bookstoreguide.org/2007/11/paludans-book-caf-copenhagen.html http://www.cafe-retro.dk/ + and by all means go to Christiania... Manefiskeren - the central cafe, is online too = yummy veggie food at Morgenstedet + and "Norrebro" is CPh's kreuzkolln, eg. cafes online in Elmegade

rough summary:
900-1300s NO (nastup christianity v 1000s-1100s)
late 1300s-1521 Kalmar Union = DK+NO+SW (maju si byt rovni, ale DK aj tak ruluje)
1521-1814 DK+NO vs SW (NO v tazkom zavese za DK; nastup protestantizmu v 1500s)
1814-1905 SW+NO, DK (NO ma len pomaly rozvoj)
od 1905 uz konecne neni vassal state (v 1814 bolo pol roka samostatne, a predtym do 1300s)

povodni domorodci (north+central NO) = Sámi people.
900 – po bitke pri Stavangeri Harald Fairhair unitol Vikingov = prvy NO kral, tvrda ruka, tak miestni odchadzaju kolonizovat okolie (IS, Greenland, Faroe, zalozili napriklad Dublin).
1000s-1100s – christianity replaces norse traditions.
Feudalism never really developed in Norway and Sweden, as it did in the rest of Europe.
1300s: Black Death kills 50-60% NO – velmi dlho sa z toho spamatavali.

1397: NO+DK kralovna Margaret si nasla Erika a v Kalmare bol korunovany za krala NO+DK+SW = Kalmar Union.
* 1521 SW vystupuje z Kalmar Union
* 1536 nastup protestantizmu, NO sa stava tributary of DK = vsetky prijmy cirkvi idu do CPH.
* 1600s SW ziskava niekolko provincii NO (vela vojen DK-NO vs SW)
* 1611 king Christian IV napadol SW, chce ho pripojit spet k DK, ale nepodarilo sa, SW has to pay vysoke war indemnity (Aelvsborg ransom), z penazi postavi Gluckstadt (ako rival Hamburgu), vyhorene Oslo->Christiania, Christianshavn (@DK, dnes tam aj Christiania), a dalsie mesta.
* 1801+07 Battles of CPH = UK napada CPH (lebo DK-NO je neutralne kvoli obchodu s FR[Napoleon] aj s UK) => UK kontroluje waterways bwn NO a DK. => 1813 DK-NO bankrotuje.
* 1814 Congress of Vienna + Trety of Kiel: DK-NO musi odovzdat NO Svedsku (DK si necha Iceland, Greenland, Faroe). 17.5. NO ale vyhlasuje samostatnost (ustava vychadza z US a FR), DK-NO korunny princ vyhlaseny za NO krala

1814 NO+DK sa rozpada (po 436yr) – kingdom’s royal, intellectual, administrative power was centred in CPH ~ “400-Year Night” by NO romantics => NO-SW war – RU a UK ich pritlacili do spolocnej unie – v nej ma NO pomaly ekon.rozvoj => 2/2 1800s *NO romantic nationalism.
Henrik Wergeland (1808-45) anarchista a la Kropotkin or Ragnar Frisch.
1848 protesty v EUR sa NO moc nedotkli – burzoazia moc mala, centralnu moc ma aristokracia. ale Marcus Thrane (!!) utopian socialist – labour society of 20000 (incl. Ibsen) for changing social structure -> revolt -> crushed (po zalari odisiel do USA). Thrane 1851: Proudhon is “with no doubt greatest genius of our time”.
In 1850 the 22yr Ibsen used the play “Catilina” to promote the anarchist ideal about fairness and freedom without violence, investigated in a societal context, universally and individually, probably inspirated by Proudhon.
1905 NO peacefully samostatne (po 586yr, thx to Christian Michelsen shipping magnate + NO prime minister) – v referende ludia za kralovstvo.

WW1 NO neutral.
WW2 NO neutral, ale surprise attack z DE (NO had 4th largest merchant marine fleet in world & heavy water plant – DE ho potrebuju pre nuclear program – ten neskor sabotaged by NO resistance), ti instalovali kvazi protektorat (Vidkun Quisling je babkovy premier), kral a vlada vysiela radiom z Londyna a podporuje clandestine attacks against Nazis in NO.
Price control and rationing of housing and cars continued as long as until 1960.
1969 Philips objavili petroleum loziska na zapad od NO, 1973 stat zaklada Statoil, vela investicii a net income az od early 1980s.
Late 90s – zahr.dlh splateny, a NO si robi sovereign wealth fund, od 90s divisive question in politics = kolko oil penazi ma stat minut a kolko usetrit.

V krajine sa squatterská tradícia rozšírila v 80. rokoch počas vypuknutia akútnej krízy na realitnom trhu.

v 6/10 boli lokalne (alebo to su general?) volby
The left-liberal D66, right-liberal VVD (Mark Rutte 8 eb* 67 aq), and right-wing parties PVV (Geert Wilders 13 cib 63 vi) and [nationalist] TON (Rita Verdonk) all did well.
In the two communities where the PVV participated it scored well becoming the largest party in Almere and the second largest in The Hague. It was the first local election the PVV has ever contested.
christian democratic CDA faired poorly
social democratic PvdA did extremely bad
The socialist SP also suffered losses.

v 6/10 dostal vo vseob volbach VVD o kreslo viac ako PvdA. krestania prepadli, PVV ziskala vela.

VVD:
Issues rather than charisma. VVD even made the deliberate decision of running a campaign that didn’t show Rutte’s face.
To draw attention away from its uncharismatic leader, the VVD focused on issues such as safety, roads, taxes for hard working citizens, and grappling with the soaring budget deficit.
Rutte, after being a human resources manager at Unilever and a deputy minister, first of social affairs and later of education, he ran for leadership of the VVD in 2006. He narrowly and unexpectedly defeated his adversary, Rita Verdonk, the popular but controversial minister of immigration.

PVV, report polit.teoretikov v 2010:
“new radical right” () – not an extreme right-wing party, but contained some radical right-wing elements. party’s pro-Israel stance shows that it is not neo-Nazi. It tends however towards a national democratic ideology. povodne tam mali verziu ze je “extreme right-wing grouping and a threat to social cohesion and democracy”.

* Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), a centre-right Christian Democratic party. It holds to the principle that government activity should supplement but not supplant communal action by citizens. The CDA puts its philosophy between the “individualism” of the VVD and the “statism” of the PvdA.
* The Labour Party (PvdA), a social democratic, centre-left Labour party. Its programme is based on greater social, political, and economic equality for all citizens.
* The Party for Freedom (PVV), an anti-Islam nationalist-conservative party founded and dominated by Geert Wilders, formerly of the VVD. Its philosophy is based on free market economics and opposition to immigration and European integration.
* The Socialist Party (SP), in its first years a radical socialist/communist party, a Maoist split from the Communist Party Netherlands, is now a more mainstream socialist party, left from the PvdA on economic issues but at the same time taking more conservative positions on issues like integration and national identity than the PvdA.
* The People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), a conservative liberal party. It attaches great importance to private enterprise and the freedom of the individual in political, social, and economic affairs.
* Democrats 66 (D66), a social-liberal radical party. The party supports liberal policies on abortion and euthanasia and reform of the welfare state. The party is left-wing on immigration, environment and foreign policy.
* Green Left (GroenLinks) combines, as its name implies green environmentalist ideals with left-wing ideals. The party is also strongly in favour of the multicultural society.
* Christian Union (ChristenUnie), a Christian-democratic party made up by mostly orthodox Protestant Christians, with conservative stances on abortion, euthanasia and gay marriage. In other areas the party is considered centre-left, for instance on immigration, welfare state and environment.
* The Party for the Animals is a single-issue animal rights party with natural affinity for environmental issues. In general, the party is considered left of the centre.
* The Political Reformed Party (SGP), the most orthodox Protestant party with conservative policies: government is only to serve God. It is a testimonial party. Only in 2006 and after heavy political pressure were women allowed to be members of this party.
* Proud of the Netherlands (Trots op Nederland), the political movement associated with independent parliamentarian and former government

minister of the VVD, Rita Verdonk. It takes a patriotic, populist stand on most political issues.

The first Muslims who settled in the Netherlands were Indonesians who fled from its bloody war of Independence @ 19th c.
imigr vlna @ 60s-1973 – NL oficialne nabera pracovnu silu – najma MOR a TR, ti potom do krajiny prinasaju rodiny via family reunification laws.
A number of Surinamese Muslims came to the Netherlands before and after the independence of Suriname in 1975.
In 80s and especially since 90s, Muslims have also come to the Netherlands as refugees and asylum seekers, mainly from Bosnia, Somalia, Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan
Dnes immigr najma via marriage migration & family reunification laws.
In 2005?3 NL passed immigration laws which force future immigrants and their prospective Dutch partners to abide by very strict requirements. Immigrants must pass tests showing knowledge of Dutch in their home countries. The Dutch partner must be at least 21 years old and prove income of at least 120% minimum wage. These strict laws have caused many Dutch interested in marrying people from other countries to move to Belgium for a temporary period, in what has been called “The Belgian Route”. => od 03 silne klesol priliv TR a MOR.
about 400 mosques in the Netherlands, with about 200 Turkish mosques, 140 Moroccan mosques and 50 Surinamese.
45 Islamic elementary schools, and two high schools.

all foreign nationals who have legally resided in the country for five years have the right to vote in local elections

marokanci volia malo, turci ovela viac.
viac orgs maju turci, ale spolupracuju s marokancami.
van gogha zabil marokanec.
hofstad su tiez mar.

Hofstad – oznacenie tajnou sluzbou
muslimski marokanci
group is influenced by the ideology of Takfir wal-Hijra.
Redouan al-Issar, also known as “The Syrian” is the suspected spiritual leader of the group.
Most media attention is attracted by Mohammed Bouyeri, sentenced to life imprisonment for murdering van Gogh (2004) and by Samir Azzouz, suspected of planning terrorist attacks on the Dutch parliament and several strategic targets such as the national airport and a nuclear reactor.
Group is also suspected of planning to kill several members of government and parliament.
Bouyeri 78, al-Issar 55?65, ostatni 20-somethings

In 2006 Minister of Justice Piet Hein Donner (christ dem) provoked an outcry when he suggested the Netherlands might accept Sharia law in a constitutional manner. “It is a sure certainty for me: if two thirds of all Netherlanders tomorrow would want to introduce Sharia, then this possibility must exist. Could you block this legally? It would also be a scandal to say ‘this isn’t allowed! The majority counts. That is the essence of democracy.” The statements were categorically refused by parties across the political spectrum, as well as by one Muslim leader.

ad statna hymna a vlastenectvo by id adam
(moja verzia – prababka)
http://kyberia.sk/id/5210889
korene sú jasné. Slovenská intelektuálna elita sa voči vlastenectvu vymedzila už na začiatku, keď SR ako štát vznikla. Väčšina elít bola proti rozpadu ČSFR. Keďže mafiánska klika potrebovala samostatné Slovensko kvôli svojim zlodejským zámerom (s národom to malo pramálo spoločné), stavili na národnú kartu, pretože je to najjednoduchšie. Od vtedy sa téma vlastenectva spája s najväčším bahnom, ktoré na Slovensku máme – od Mečiara, cez Slotu, Rafaja, Malíkovú až po Markuša. S týmto sa intelektuálna elita nemôže identifikovať a teda má prirodzenú potrebu vymedziť sa proti tomu. Žiaľ, za 20 rokov sa nenašiel nikto z “demokratického” politického spektra, kto by bol schopný redefinovať vlastenectvo a prevziať národnú agendu. Prvý, kto to mimo hejslováckych mafiánskych štruktúr spravil je paradoxne komunista Fico a vychádza mu to (čo je úplne jasné, vlastnectvo je dobrá agenda) – o dôvod viac pre intelektuálov káľať na všetko, čo sa s tým spája. Mne je z tejto našej elity na blitie, včerajší Hríbov komentár, dnes Fila a x ďalších. Sami si tú tému nechali ukradnúť a teraz drístajú tak, že to snaď nie je ani možné. A ľudia, ktorí nemajú radi Rafaja sú prirodzene s nimi, bez toho, aby sa zamysleli nad obsahom.
+
http://kyberia.sk/id/5209176
Najlacnejším druhom hrdosti je však hrdosť národná; prezrádza totiž o tom, kto je ňou ovládaný, že trpí nedostatkom individuálnych vlastností, na ktoré by mohol byť hrdý – inak by nesiahal po niečom, čo má spoločné s toľkými miliónmi. Kto má významné osobné prednosti, bude skôr spoznávať chyby svojho vlastného národa, lebo ich má ustavične na očiach. No každý žalostný hlupák, ktorý nemá na svete nič, na čo by mohol byť hrdý, siaha po poslednom prostriedku, aby hrdý mohol byť, po národe, ku ktorému práve patrí; ním pookrieva a je vďačne pripravený hájiť všetky chyby a hlúposti svojho národa rukami aj nohami.
Národnému charakteru, keďže sa týka množstva, nikdy nebude možné úprimne priznať veľa dobrého. Ako národný charakter sa skôr nazýva odlišná forma, v akej sa v každej krajine javí ľudská ohraničenosť, zvrátenosť a špatnosť.
(Schopenhauer)

q: “where does power lie in the global network society?”
communication is the central power in contemporary society.
via power vs counter-power; multinational corporate media networks vs creative audience; biased/scandal media politics vs insurgent grassroots media politics.
[10] defines power in a Weber-inspired way as “the relational capacity that enables a social actor to influence asymmetrically the decisions of other social actor(s) in ways that favor the empowered actor’s will, interests, and values”

[42-47,418-420] 4 kinds of power in the network society:
* networking power –
* network power
* networked power
* network-making power: “paramount form of power in the network society”; held and exercised by programmers and switchers; analysed via power struggles between the global corporate multimedia networks and the creative audience (chapter 2), the development of media policies in the USA (chapter 2), framing and counter-framing in political campaigns, especially the framing of the US public mind before, during, and after the Iraq war (chapter 3); to scandal politics in Spain in the 1990s (chapter 4), media control and censorship in the USA, Russia, and China (chapter 4); the environmental movement, the global movement against corporate globalization, the spontaneous citizens’ movement that emerged in Spain after the al-Qaeda attacks in 2004, and the Barack Obama presidential primary campaign (chapter 5).

Fuchs about “new web“:
– Tapscott and Williams claim that the “new web” brings about “a new economic democracy (…) in which we all have a lead role“ (2007)
– Kelly argues that the “new web”, where people “work toward a common goal and share their products in common, (…) contribute labor without wages and enjoy the fruits free of charge” (Kelly, 2009, p. 118) constitutes a “new socialism” – “digital socialism”. The new socialism is for Kelly a socialism, in which workers do not control and manage organizations and the material output they generate. Therefore this notion of socialism should be questioned. For Kelly, socialism lies in collective production, not in democratic economic ownership. If “socialism seeks to replace capitalism by a system in which the public interest takes precedence over the interest of private profit“, “is incompatible with the concentration of economic power in the hands of a few“, and “requires effective democratic control of the economy“ (Frankfurt Declaration of the Socialist International, 19511), then Kelly’s notion of socialism that is perfectly compatible with the existence of Microsoft, Google, Yahoo, and other web corporations (as indicated by the fact that he lists Google, Amazon, Facebook, and YouTube in his history of socialism), is not at all a notion of socialism, but one of capitalism disguised as socialism. [critique also by Lessig: http://lessig.org/blog/2009/05/et_tu_kk_aka_no_kevin_this_is.html, http://lessig.org/blog/2009/05/on_socialism_round_ii.html ]
– Castells about ‘new web’ in a refreshing techno-dialectical way that avoids the deterministic pitfalls of technooptimism and techno-pessimism. For Castells, a novel quality of communication in contemporary society is mass self-communication. The three forms of communication (interpersonal, mass communication, and mass selfcommunication) coexist, interact, and complement each other rather than substituting for one another. Castells theorizes mass self-communication based on Eco’s semiotic model of communication as the emergence of “the creative audience” (pp. 127-135) that engages in the “interactive production of meaning” (p. 132) and is based on the emergence of the figure of the “sender/addressee” (p. 130). contemporary Internet = conflict bwn global multimedia business networks that try to commodify the Internet VS “creative audience” that tries to establish a degree of citizen control of the Internet and to assert their right of communicative freedom without corporate control.

Fuchs about autonomy of communicative subjects:
– autonomy in the sense of Kant, understood as the autonomy of the will as the supreme principle of morality (Kant, 2002, p. 58), the “quality of the will of being a law to itself” (Kant, 2002, p. 63)
– autonomy as “true individualism” that Hayek (1948) had in mind, in which capitalism is conceived as spontaneous order that should be left to itself and should not be shaped by political rules (Hayek, 1988)
– autonomy as freedom of speech, taste, and assembly – “the liberty of thought and discussion” – in line with the harm principle, as postulated by John Stuart Mill (2002)
– autonomy as the existence of functionally differentiated self-referential subsystems of society (Luhmann, 1998)
– autonomy in a less individualistic sense as the combination of individual autonomy, understood as subjectivity that is “reflective and deliberative” and “frees the radical imagination” from “the enslavement of repetition” (Castoriadis, 1991, p. 164), and social autonomy, “the equal participation of all in power” (Castoriadis, 1991, p. 136; see also Castoriadis, 1998)
– theoretically unreconciled relationship of private autonomy and public autonomy that Habermas (1996, p. 84) has critically examined
– dialectic of autonomy that Habermas has in mind when he speaks of a “cooriginality of private and public autonomy” (Habermas, 1996, p. 104) achieved in a “system of rights in which private and public autonomy are internally related” (Habermas, 1996, p. 280) and “reciprocally presuppose each other” (Habermas, 1996, p. 417)
– autonomy as the “status of an organized people in an enclosed territorial unit” (Schmitt, 1996, p. 19, for a critique of this approach see Habermas, 1989)
– autonomy as a postmodern project of plural democracy with a multiplicity of subject positions (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985)

For Castells, there are the following new aspects of media politics: the use of the Internet in political campaigns (p. 230), the multiplication of entry points of political reports, on which an interaction between mainstream media and the Internet is based (p. 234), an unprecedented prevalence and significance of scandal politics (p. 246), the easy and immediate diffusion of scandal politics over the Internet by everyone (pp. 247f), an increase of the publicity and perception of corruption and of the impact on public trust (p. 289). The result would be a worldwide crisis of political legitimacy, a decline in public trust, and a crisis of democracy. These crises could possibly, but not automatically result in depoliticization, and would in many cases also create a desire for insurgent politics, social movements, and new public spaces.

THIS BOOK
is sequel to Empire {which described a current form of global order as networked power of nation-states (G8), institutions (WTO, NATO, IMF) and corporations, being constituted by permanent state of (civil) war}
Empire (new global form of sovereigny–empire) => Multitude (emerging global class formation–multitude) ~ reverse of Hobbes’ De Cive (1642; social body and forms of citizenship–nascent bourgeoisie which needed political power above it as abs.authority) => Leviathan (1651; future form of sovereignty–nation-state)

PREFACE
war
democracy
multitude = possibility of democracy on a global scale; also provides means to achieve it; alternative growing within Empire; is network in which all differences can be expressed freely and equally; is not identity / the people (is unitary conception; is single identity; is one); is not uniform / the masses (are indifferent; where all colors fade to gray); is not the working class (separates workers from owners who don’t work; separates industrial workers from service/agricultural workers; separates waged workers from unpaid laborers); has good model in internet (nodes are different but connected; new can always be added); internal differences of multitude must discover (or rather produce) the common that allows them to communicate/act together (while remaining different)
shifts in global economy – industrial working class no longer plays hegemonic role in global economy; production is not only in economic terms, but social production (of communications/relationships/forms of life)
the common = not the commons (refers to pre-capitalist-shared spaces that were destroyed by advent of private property); our communication/collaboration/cooperation are not only based on the common but they in turn produce the common in expanding spiral relationship; production of the common = central to every form of social production + is primary characteristic of new dominant forms of labor today
biopolitical production = newly dominant model of production; it not only involves the production of material goods in strictly economic sense but also touches on and produces all facets of social life, economic, cultural, and political; is strong pillar of multitude
“political” organization = second pillar of multitude; resistance/revolutionary orgs as not only means to achieve democracy, but to create internally the democratic relationships
Empire = new form of global order (no longer as imperialism via nation-state extending in a foreign territory)
network power = new form of sovereignty; its nodes = dominant nation-states + supranational institutions + major capitalist corporations + other powers; is “imperial”, not “imperialist”; is tendency; unilateralism (USA as dominant power) neither multilateralism (UN) are not just desirable but not even possible; perpetual war ~ state of (civil) war is inevitable in Empire and functions as instrument of rule; imperial peace (Pax Imperii) is false pretense of peace

WAR
[12-13] war si becoming permanent social relation
Clausewitz: war is a continuation of politics by other mean; today some theorists: war is becoming the primary organizing principle of society, and politics merely one of its means or guises
Mao: politics is simply a war without bloodshed
Gramsci: political strategies: either wars of position or war of maneuver
war has become regime of biopower – form of rule aimed not only at controlling population but producing/reproducing all aspects of social life
[14-15] consequences:
– limits of war are indeterminate, both spatially and temporally
– int’l relations and domestic politics become increasingly similar and intermingled
– reorientation of conception of the sides of battle or conditions of enmity (eg against terrorism)
[38-39] shift in int’l rels: not that much 1989, as 26 may 1972, when USA+USSR signed Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty which regulated nuclear weapons production of 2 superpowers ~ mass bombing like @WW2 could no longer be part of art of war; war begun to be less oriented twd defending against coherent mega-threat and more focused on proliferating mini-threats; less intent on general destruction of enemy and more inclined twd transformation or even production of enemy; high-intensity police actions (~low-intensity warfare; eg US @Vietnam or Latin Am, or USSR @Afg) rather than all-out large-scale combat
[39] early 70s: 1971 delinking US$ from gold standard; 1973 first oil crisis; bgn of destruction of welfare state; bgn of shift of hegemony of econ.prod. from factory to more social/immaterial sectors
[40-41] “military-industrial complex” = simplification eliminating any real considerations of class conflict, insurgency, and movements of multitude; term was created to name a confluence of interests in imperialist phase of capitalist development bwn major corps and state military/policy apparatus (eg. Knupp steel works and German army; Dassault aviation manufacturing and Gaullist military policies; or Lloyds insurance and British imperialist projects; or Boeing and Pentagon); now rather “military-vital complex”

MULTITUDE
[196-197] flesh of the multitude produces in common in a way that always exceeds the measure of any traditional social bodies, and it doesn’t produce chaos and social disorder, but what it produces is common, and that common we share serves as the basis for future production, in a spiral, expansive relationship (eg. communication as production: we can communicate only on the basis of languages, symbols, ideas, and relationships we share in common, and in turn the results of our communication are new common languages, symbols, ideas and relationships); today this dual relationship between production and the common–the common is produced and it is also productive–is key to understanding all social and economic activity
[198] singularities interact and communicate socially on basis of the common, and their social comm. in turn produces the common; multitude is subjectivity that emerges from this dynamic of singularity and commonality
[199] shift from habit (american pragmatist philosophy) to performance as core notion of production of the common
[202] production of the common tends to displace trad.divisions bwn individual/society, subjective/objective, private/public
[203-204] WRONG: “private” = includes the rights and freedoms of social subjects together with the rights of private property, blurring the distinction between the two. this confusion results from the ideology of “possessive individualism” in modern legal theory, that conceives every aspect/attribute of subject, from its interests and desires down to its soul, as “properties” that are owned by individual, reducing all facets of subjectivity to the economic realm; “private” = subjective + material “possessions”; “public” = state control + what is held and managed in common; WE NEED alt legal strategy/framework: conception of privacy that expresses singularity of social subjectivities (not private property) and conception of public based on the common [commonality] (not state control)–one might say a postliberal and postsocialist legal theory; good example: “postsystems theory” school, which is molecular conception of law and production of norms that is based on constant/free/open interaction among singularities, which through their communication produces common norms
[204] community = often refers to moral unity that stands above population and its interactions like sovereign power
[204] the common IS NOT community; IS NOT public; it is based on communication among singularities and emerges through collaborative social processes of production
[205] neolib. legal frameworks – privatization of public goods (water, air, land, and all systems of mgmt of life: healthcare, pensions) and privatization of public services (telecom and other network industries, post, public transp., energy sys, edu); these public goods and services were very basis of modern sovereignty in hands of nation-state

/ Sylvère Lotringer has criticized Negri and Hardt’s use of the concept for its ostensible return to the dialectical dualism in the introduction to Paulo Virno’s A Grammar of the Multitude

http://burundi.sk/monoskop/log/?p=399

[74]

[49-51]

[11]

A central task for reimagining society today is to develop an alternative management of the common wealth we share.

two distinct but related domains of the common:
– ECO ecological (natural) common [but this category is insufficient] – earth and all of its ecosystems, including the atmosphere, the oceans and rivers, and the forests, as well as all the forms of life that interact with them.
– ART social and economic (artificial) common [but this category is insufficient] – products of human labor and creativity that we share, such as ideas, knowledges, images, codes, affects, social relationships, and the like.

ECO & ART:
common in both domains confounds the traditional measures of economic value and imposes instead the value of life as the only valid scale of evaluation.

contradictions (ale ukazuju sa ako complementaries):
ECO – pro conservation, since earth is limited, logic of scarcity; ART – pro creation, open/limitless nature of production of common; ALE: both perspectives refer fundamentally to production/reproduction of forms of life, which are happening simultaneously (since eg. work-time vs non-work time collapsed)
ART – interests of humanity as central (ie. extend our politics to all humanity, overcome hierarchies/exclusions of class and property, gender and sexuality, race and ethnicity..); ECO – interests much broader than human/animal worlds; ALE: navzajom sa mozu ucit eko-aktivisti a humanrights-aktivisti

The claim for centrality of the common relies on the hypothesis that we are in the midst of an epochal shift from a capitalist economy centered on industrial production to one centered on what can be called immaterial or biopolitical production. Toni Negri and I have argued this hypothesis over the course of three books — Empire, Multitude, and Commonwealth.
– {industrial capitalism THEN} Industrial production has been central, rather, in the sense that the qualities of industry — its forms of mechanization, its working day, its wage relations, its regimes of time discipline and precision, and so forth — have progressively been imposed over other sectors of production and social life as a whole, creating not only an industrial economy but also an industrial society.
– {industrial capitalism IS OVER} industry no longer marks the hierarchical position in the various divisions of labor and, more significantly, that the qualities of industry are no longer being imposed over other sectors and society as a whole.
– {immaterial/biopolitical production NOW} (central position of industry is taken over by) production of immaterial goods or goods with a significant immaterial component, such as ideas, knowledges, languages, images, code, and affects (health care workers and educators, fast food workers, call center workers, and flight attendants). The cognitive and affective tools of immaterial production, the precarious, non-guaranteed nature of its wage relations, the temporality of immaterial production (which tends to destroy the structures of the working day and blur the traditional divisions between work-time and nonwork-time), as well as its other qualities are becoming generalized.
+ property: immobile (eg. land) => mobile (eg. commodities) => immaterial (discussions about patents/copyrights; question of exclusivity and reproductibility)

2 contradictions, 2 shared logics form significant basis for understanding guises of common & struggle to preserve/further them; foundation for linking forms of political activism aimed at the autonomy and democratic management of the common:

I. contradiction between private property and the common.
ART: bwn need for common in interest of productivity and need for private in interest of capitalist accumulation
ECO: bwn private nature of accumulation and social nature of resulting damages

II. the common defies traditional capitalist measures of value (or obey radically different scale based on value of life, which we have not yet invented)
ART: value of biopolitical/immaterial goods is immeasurable using traditional system of measure of econ.value; economists cast them as “externalities”, accountants as “intangible assets” (of esoteric value), (global bankrupt largely derives from this)
ECO: value of the common is immeasurable (eg. how much $ is damage costs of having half of Bangladesh under water? or permanent draught in Ethiopia? or destruction of trad. Inuit forms of life?)

watch out (when struggle for the common operate according to opposing logics in ECO and ART):
III. preserve ECO vs limitless prod ART
IV. humanity as frame of reference @ART vs broader @ECO

next: UN Climate Conference, Copenhagen, Dec 2009

next: the common @identity and identity politics; the common @social institutions (family, nation, ..)

[82-83]

I use the concept of agonistic pluralism to present a new way to think about democracy which is different from the traditional liberal conception of democracy as a negotiation among interests and is also different to the model which is currently being developed by people like Jurgen Habermas and John Rawls. While they have many differences, Rawls and Habermas have in common the idea that the aim of the democratic society is the creation of a consensus, and that consensus is possible if people are only able to leave aside their particular interests and think as rational beings. However, while we desire an end to conflict, if we want people to be free we must always allow for the possibility that conflict may appear and to provide an arena where differences can be confronted. The democratic process should supply that arena.
http://www.redpepper.org.uk/article563.html

BRIC on 5 June in St Petersburg: We have reached our limit in subsidizing the United States’ military encirclement of Eurasia while also allowing the US to appropriate our exports, companies, stocks and real estate in exchange for paper money of questionable worth. | “The artificially maintained unipolar system,” Mr. Medvedev spelled out, is based on “one big centre of consumption, financed by a growing deficit, and thus growing debts, one formerly strong reserve currency, and one dominant system of assessing assets and risks.”2 At the root of the global financial crisis, he concluded, is that the United States makes too little and spends too much. Especially upsetting is its military spending, such as the stepped-up US military aid to Georgia announced just last week, the NATO missile shield in Eastern Europe and the US buildup in the oil-rich Middle East and Central Asia.
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=13969

The divide is between those nations which are still embedded within the dollar system, including countries in the Eurozone, versus those emerging economies—especially the BRIC—Brazil, Russia, India, China—where new economic markets and regions are rapidly replacing their over-dependence on the United States as prime export market and prime source for investment finance. | BRIC have demographic advantage. | Interesting to recall is that the hidden story of the pre-1914 German ‘economic miracle’ was based on a similar ‘secret’—rapid and dynamic young and growing population, while that of Great Britain and France was stagnant or in decline after the British Great Depression of 1873 which led to huge emigration of population to the USA.
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=13926

With 99.9% of the districts counted the Pirates have 7.1 percent of the votes, beating several established parties. This means that the Pirate Party will get at least one, but most likely two of the 18 (+2) available seats Sweden has at EP | The turnout at the elections is 43%, a little higher than the at 2004 elections. This would mean that roughly 200,000 Swedes have voted for PP. This is a huge increase compared to the national elections of 2006 where the party got 34,918 votes | After the Pirate Bay verdict, PP membership more than tripled and they now have over 48,000 registered members, more than the total number of votes they received in 2006. | With their presence in Brussels, Pirate Party hopes to reduce the abuses of power and copyright at the hands of the entertainment industries, and make those activities illegal instead. On the other hand they hope to legalize file-sharing for personal use. | In Germany Pirate Party got cca 1% of votes, not enough for a seat in EP.
http://torrentfreak.com/pirate-party-wins-and-enters-the-european-parliament-090607/

Great Depression was offspring of killing fields @EU: WWI had destroyed trading patterns, undermined currencies and produced massive public debts. Who would foot the bill for this catastrophe? US had financed UK and FR victories, and expected to be paid back in full. UK and FR demanded that DE carry the cost by paying reparations. DE —which been victorious on their Eastern front and had prevented Allied forces from entering their territory—had agreed to end war in part because of Wilson’s promise not to impose a victor’s peace. When this promise was broken and massive reparations were imposed, a bitter decade-long battle over who would pay what ensued. From this toxic environment of distrust and enmity emerged a series of unsustainable deals,whereby US financed DE’s reparations to UK and FR, which were recycled back to US in form of war debt payments. If US financing dried up –which it did during the late 1920s—the whole scheme would collapse, taking the int’l monetary system with it
http://whatmatters.mckinseydigital.com/globalization/getting-history-right

The challenge is how to give more citizens a voice in governance without overwhelming their representatives. There are two approaches; both rely on existing technology. In order to participate in online democracy, one needs a verifiable identity. The current version of that technology is the “digital certificate”. Members of Congress and Hill staffers tell me that a message from a verified member of their district carries far more weight than a (possibly mass-produced) e-mail. That’s one near-term way to move closer to networked democracy. A more ambitious approach would involve large-scale discussion boards in which every citizen, with a verified identity, could weigh in on issues. The challenge here would be to sort the wheat from the chaff. The solution is to let the citizenry to do the sorting itself by filtering up the best suggestions online. Early forms of such methods are visible on slashdot.org, digg.com, and even Amazon.com.
http://whatmatters.mckinseydigital.com/internet/participatory-technocracy

Vztah občana té či oné členské země a představitele Unie není standardním vztahem voliče a politika, který jej reprezentuje. Mezi občany a představiteli Unie je navíc vzdálenost, a to nejen v zeměpisném slova smyslu, která je podstatně větší než je tomu uvnitř jednotlivých členských zemí. Označuje se to různými termíny: demokratický deficit, ztráta demokratické accountability, rozhodování nevolených, ale vyvolených, byrokratizace rozhodování, a podobně. Návrhy na změnu dnešního stavu obsažené v zamítnuté Evropské ústavě či od ní fakticky málo odlišné Lisabonské smlouvě, by tento defekt ještě zvětšovaly. [..] Řešením není ani přitápění pod “tavícím kotlem” dosavadního typu evropské integrace, ani potlačování role členských států pod heslem nové multikulturní a multinacionální evropské občanské společnosti. [..] ..mylné interpretování příčin dnešní finanční a ekonomické krize, jakoby ji způsobil trh, zatímco skutečnou příčinou je pravý opak. Způsobilo ji politické manipulování trhu.
http://zpravy.idnes.cz/dokument-projev-prezidenta-klause-v-evropskem-parlamentu-pny-/domaci.asp?c=A090219_130248_domaci_lpo