lepsie v: http://burundi.sk/dusan/carrythatweight/images/5/51/Pzi.esej.research.txt
semiotexte’s Foucault: Fearless Speech (2001)
prednasky v EN @ uni of cal in berkeley z 10-11/83 (dnes som inak komentoval assangeovo video
zeditovane pearsonom v 85
goal:
” My intention was not to deal with the problem of truth, but with the problem of truth-teller or truth-telling as an activity.
By this I mean that, for me, it was not a question of analyzing the internal or external criteria that would enable the Greeks and Romans,
or anyone else, to recognize whether a statement or proposition is true or not. At issue for me was rather the attempt
to consider truth-telling as a specific activity, or as a role. ” Discourse & Truth, Concluding remarks by Foucault.
/ ciel: nie schopnost urcit ci je vyrok pravdivy alebo nie, ale chapat pravdomluvnost ako specificku aktivitu, ako rolu.
” With the question of the importance of telling the truth, knowing who is able to tell the truth,
and knowing why we should tell the truth, we have the roots of what we could call the ‘critical’ tradition in the West.”
CHECK [107] – practice of parrhesia @ human relationships
[p 11-20]
[core] parrhesia = frankness + truth + criticism + danger + duty
– being ‘FRANK’ (instead of PERSUASION), povedat vsetko co mam na mysli, nic neskryvam
parrhesia – 2 types:
– ‘bad’ parrhesia ~ not far from ‘chattering’, saying any/everything one has in mind w/o qualification;
everyone has the right to address his fellow citizens even with the most stupid or dangerous things in the city;
verbal activity which reflects every movement of heart & mind
/ blogging, comments, twitter, ‘kazdy prd’ na youtube, total transparency freak leaking
– [core] positive parrhesia, ‘to tell the TRUTH’ (instead of FALSEHOOD or SILENCE);
p says what he _thinks_ is true [via mind], or does he say what _is_ really true [via ontology] ? —
he says what is true because he _knows_ that it _is_ true [mind+ontology], and he _knows_ that it is true because it is really true [mind+?].
~ there is exact coincidence bwn belief & truth [v grecku sa stretavali verbalne; v dnesnej kartezianskej koncepcii dokazu sa stretavaju mentalne]
/ je pravda, a niektore jej casti poznam.
cize nielenze je uprimny, ale navyse jeho nazor je pravdivy.
[core] cize zaroven tomu veri a zaroven to je pravda.
v grecku je pristup k pravde dany moralkou, ak mam urcite moralne vlastnosti, tak mam pristup k pravde (a tiez k jej odovzdaniu dalsim).
[core] u descarta to je inak, on si nie je isty ci to comu veri, je tiez pravda.
[core] ‘proof’ of sincerity of truth-teller is his ‘courage’
ak clovek povie nieco nebezpecne, je velke podozrenie ze je truth-teller.
vtedy sa pytame sami seba: je naozaj truth-teller? a – ako si moze byt isty ze to comu veri je pravda? (ta druha otazka sa grekov moc netyka, neriesili to)
[core] podmienka pre parrhesiu je pritomnost nebezpecenstva, ‘DANGER’, ze teller nieco riskuje
(napr ucitel povie detom ze ich uci – tym nic neriskuje, ale ked filozof povie tyranovi ze tyrania je zla lebo neni kompatibilna so spravodlivostou, tak riskuje)
[!] tyran neni truth-teller, lebo nic neriskuje
[core] a ten danger vychadza vzdy z druhych stran, nevrham sa do danger sam (napriklad pred sudom povedat nieco co moze byt proti mne zneuzite).
confession to someone who exercises power over speaker, and is able to censure or punish him for what he has done,
[core] takze funkcia p nie je demonstrovat pravdu druhemu, ale kritizovat ho = ‘CRITICISM’ (instead of FLATTERY),
alebo aj criticism sam voci sebe (ale vzdy ked speaker je v inferior pozicii).
[core] vzdy slabsi voci silnejsiemu (nie naopak, napr rodic voci dietatu, ale: filozof tyrana, ziak ucitela, obcan vacsinu)
[core] telling the truth is regarded as a (moral) ‘DUTY’ (instead of SELF-INTEREST and MORAL APATHY)
ked ma nikto netlaci hovorit, ale ja citim povinnost prehovorit, mam ‘FREEDOM’ prehovorit (nie som pod natlakom).
napr kriminal – p neni ked sa prizna pred sudom, ale ked sa prizna dobrovolne z moralnej povinnosti.
kritizovat priatela alebo panovnika – lebo je moja duty mu pomoct (kedze on nevidi jeho wrongdoings).
…..
/ !!!!! takze denouncement neni kompatibilny s parrhesiou !!!!
skor truthful criticism of a friend out of duty (risking our friendship), for his own good (and my good too)
[p 20-24]
tracing evolution of parrhesia via r/p/p:
rhetoric (long speech) is in strong opposition to parrhesia (dialogue) @socratic-platonic tradition,
ale neskor sa zacali blizit – parrhesia/freespeech ako retoricka figura (ktora ale nema prikrasy, a neni vlastne figura) & intesifies audience emotions
politics
@ atenska demokracia – which is def as constitution (politeia) in which ppl enjoyed ‘demokratia’, ‘isegoria’ (equal right of speech),
‘isonomia’ (equal part of all citizens in exercise of power), and ‘parrhesia’,
parrhesia appears in agora
@ hellenistic period – it’s advisor’s duty to use parrhesia to help king w/ decisions, and to prevent him from abusing his power (cize je dobra aj pre ludi),
ak ho kral ignoruje alebo tresta, je tyran,
parrhesia doesnt appear in agora anymore (iba medzi kralom a radcami, mimo dohlad ludi)
philosophy @ field of art of life
socrates in plato writings is p,
rel to ‘care of oneself’
[p 104]
[core] care of the self – what i think corresponds to what i say, and it corresponds to what i do (as in case of socrates, ultimate truth-teller) (?)
parrhesia = logos ~ truth ~ bios @ ethics; logos ~ truth ~ nomos @ politics
philosophical (new) parrhesia
– 3 types [p 106]:
1
2
3
– target: not to persuade the Assembly, but to convince someone that he must take care of himself and of others (= change his life)
– not specifically linked to agora or king’s court, but diverse places