not

v http://burundi.sk/dusan/carrythatweight/images/3/30/Lev_Manovich_-_Software_Takes_Command_%282008%29.txt

z Santner, Eric L – On Creaturely Life. Rilke, Benjamin, Sebald.pdf

[ch 1]
‘state of exception’ (o nej pisem v eseji 1) – sebald’s ‘creaturely life’ (@santner’s book), heidegger, agamben, rilke, benjamin (‘petrified unrest’)
~ how human bodies and psyches register the “states of exception” that punctuate the “normal” run of social and political life.
The “essential disruption” that renders man “creaturely” for these writers has, that is, a distinctly political—or better, biopolitical—
aspect; it names the threshold where life becomes a matter of politics and politics comes to inform the very matter and materiality of life.
(eg. German Jews)
[ch 3]
~ ‘undeadness’ – the space between real and symbolic death = ultimate domain of creaturely life.
@ Sebald: the vampire, the Wandering Jew, Kafka’s hunter Gracchus, and Balzac’s Colonel Chabert.
( + zizek’s exception book )
[ch 4]
“postmemory,” a term coined by Marianne Hirsch to capture the peculiarities of the memory of events that hover
between personal memory and impersonal history, events one has not lived through oneself but that, in large measure through exposure
to the stories of those who did experience them, have nonetheless entered into the fabric of the self.
/ oralne historie nezazitych velkych eventov (00s o 60s)
freud’s ‘uncanny’ = ?

z Kostelanetz, Richard – Conversing With Cage, 2nd ed (2003)

cage, 83
I’m on the side of keeping things mysterious, and I have never enjoyed
understanding things. If I understand something, I have no further use for it. So I try to make a
music which I don’t understand and which will be difficult for other people to understand, too.

cage, 85
I like art to remain mysterious. I find that as long as a book or a painting or a piece of music is
not understood by me that I can use it. I mean use it in order to employ my faculties. If I
understand something I can put it on a shelf and leave it there. In the past I thought it had to do
with the feeling in Europe of a tradition or the history, whereas we here in America have very
little sense of history.

!!! cage, 72
I have from time to time, either for myself or for others, made statements that are like manifestos.
You know this is popular in the field of the arts—to say in a manifesto-style statement what
distinguishes the contemporary or modern thing from what isn’t. The first time I was asked to do
it, I did it with regard to painting.
I said that a painting was modern if it was not interrupted by
the effect of its environment—so that if shadows or spots or so forth fell on a painting and spoilt
it, then it was not a modern painting, but if they fell on it and, so to speak, were fluent with it,
then it was a modern painting.
Then, of course, I have said the same thing about music. If the music can accept ambient sounds
and not be interrupted thereby, it’s a modern piece of music. If, as with a composition of
Beethoven, a baby crying, or someone in the audience coughing, interrupts the music, then we
know that it isn’t modern. I think that the present way of deciding whether something is useful as
art is to ask whether it is interrupted by the actions of others, or whether it is fluent with the
actions of others.
What I have been saying is an extension of these notions out of the field of the
material of the arts into what you might call the material of society. If, for instance, you made a
structure of society that would be interrupted by the actions of people who were not in it, then it
would not be the proper structure.
^ aliens, my art, open work, participative, ….theory building

cage, 77
I think the history of art is simply a history of getting rid of the ugly by entering into it, and using
it. After all, the notion of something outside of us being ugly is not outside of us but inside of us.
And that’s why I keep reiterating that we’re working with our minds. What we’re trying to do is
to get them open so that we don’t see things as being ugly, or beautiful, but we see them just as
they are.

cage, 66
Formerly, one was accustomed to thinking of art as something better organized than life that
could be used as an escape from life. The changes that have taken place in this century, however,
are such that art is not an escape from life, but rather an introduction to it.

cage, 1978 – on improvised jazz
Aside from the question of rhythmic regularity, one of the reasons for my reticence regarding
jazz has to do with its conception and use of improvisation. This matter of improvisation has
always greatly concerned me. What I have never appreciated in improvisation is the return to
memory or to taste: the return of things that have been learned or to which one has become
accustomed—sometimes consciously, deliberately, sometimes insidiously. Phrases thought to be
original are only articulations heard a long time ago. In improvisation, when you think you are
following your own direction, most of the time you are following someone else’s line. At the
most, that is not what bothers me so much as the desire for uniqueness that appears in the act of
improvising. Once you realize the number of obstacles and of more or less deliberate references
that the improviser is struggling with, you can only smile at the claim to originality. The desire
for originality seems to be one of the great myths of jazz (and of a good part of contemporary
music in the classic tradition as well, for that matter). And it seems that not even “free jazz”
escapes this. I am bothered by these disproportionate assertions of the ego when I hear them. For
my own part, I do not look for originality. Whether or not my music is original does not concern
me. I would prefer to find a music separate from my memory and my tastes, which would in
some way be a discovery for me, and that has nothing to do with originality, because intention is
not involved. (Originality is always an effort, a state of tension. ) With an open-mindedness
toward the unintentional sound, I want not to control sound events but simply at most to write
instructions. That is why I’m against improvisation as it is usually understood (even if I
sometimes use it, because nothing should be prohibited!). [..]
The problem that jazz raises for me, at the level of rhythm, I repeat, is that I am bothered by its
regularity. I prefer the rhythm of what I call silence where sound can be born at any time.

cage, 1979 – silence & there’s always sound
I made a decision in the early fifties to accept the sounds that are in the world. Before that I had
actually been naive enough to think there was such a thing as silence. But I went into an
anechoic chamber in Cambridge, at Harvard University, and in this room I heard two sounds. I
thought there was something wrong with the room, and I told the engineer that there were two
sounds. He said describe them, and I did. “Well, ” he said, “the high one was your nervous
system in operation and the low one was your blood circulating. ” So that means that there is
music, or there is sound, whether I intend it or not.

cage, 1979 – silence & composing
What silence is is the change of my mind. It’s an acceptance of the sounds that exist rather than a
desire to choose and impose one’s own music. That has been at the center of my work ever since
then. I try when I make a new piece of music to make it in such a way that it doesn’t essentially
disturb the silence which already exists.

30+ ‘free’ gen – each time you hear free, reach your pocket vs pre-30 google gen – yea free!

controversialist, ale snad ok: “Any topic that can divide critics equally into two opposite camps..totally wrong. and .so obvious..has got to be a good one.”

este precitaj dalej

lepsie v: http://burundi.sk/dusan/carrythatweight/images/5/51/Pzi.esej.research.txt

polit econ

[186] Badiou – 3 mozne zlyhania revolucnej lavice
=> vsetko zle. treba revolucneho agenta ktory je neoddelitelnou sucastou systemu dostat do subjektivity
/ akoze treba byt politickejsi? a revolucnejsi v kazdodennosti?

Marx pre-1850s: ‘Marxist’ theory
ciel, postcapitalist society, je socialna forma kde transhistoricka praca, oslobodena od fetters of trhu a osobneho vlastnictva,
has openly emerged as the regulating principle of society.
‘economic base’ vs legal/ideological ‘superstructure’
naive historicist evolutionism ~ ahistorical absolutization of labor (process of mat prod and repr of life) as ‘key’ to other phenomena
cosi s Heideggerovou dialectic-of-Enlitenment temou technokratickej ‘instrumental reason’ to ma, ze domination is grounded in very notion of labor
eg. German Ideology

Marx v 1850s inspirovany znovucitanim Hegelovej Science of Logic, vsetko prehodnotil a skomplikoval
mainly in: Grundrisse, a najma Capital
dosiel na to ze commodity fetishism ako iluzia nie je len sekundarna reflection, ale operuje v srdci ‘realneho procesu vyroby’
cize uloha nie je odhalit ako sa z bezneho reallife objektu stava fetisizovana komodita (mysterious theological entity),
ale odhalit ‘metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties’ v naoko beznom objekte
comm fetish = belief that commodities are magical objects with inherent metaphysical powers
Karatani: marx inak zacal tym ze kritika nabozenstva je pociatok vsetkej kritiky, presiel ku kritike filozofie, a skoncil pri kritike polit econ,
pri ktorej sa oblukom dostal naspat k tomu ze viera (v objekty) je v srdci ‘prizemnej’ ekonomickej aktivity

Engels tiez chapal produkciu jednak v ekonomickom zmysle (extrakcia komodit z prirody), jednak v spolocenskom (produkcia zivota, napr rodenie)

paste z: http://burundi.sk/dusan/carrythatweight/images/5/51/Pzi.esej.research.txt

(from /not)
Cyberspace is what Deleuze
and Guattari call a “haptic” space, as opposed to an optical
one: a space of “pure connection,” accessible only to “closerange
vision,” and having to be navigated “step by step. . . .
One never sees from a distance in a space of this kind, nor
does one see it from a distance”.
No panoramic
view is possible, for the space is always folding, dividing,
expanding, and contracting. [nema zmysel robit vizualne komplexne webstranky – len tolko co clovek
vie cele prijat, v pozadi socialna navigacia, takze ‘listujem’ dalej
Time is flexible on the Net as
well; things happen at different speeds. Sometimes I must
read and type extremely fast to keep up with rapid-fire chat
room conversations. Other times I have to hold myself back
as I wait for pages or files to download.
What’s more, these
multiple speeds, times, and spaces overlap. Enveloped in
the network, I am continually being distracted.
I can no
longer concentrate on just one thing at a time. My body is
pulled in several directions at once, dancing to many distinct
rhythms. My attention fragments and multiplies as I
shift among the many windows on my screen. Being online
always means multitasking.

haptic space
=
a haptic vision of color, as opposed to the optical vision of light. What Deleuze calls haptic vision is precisely this “sense” of colors. The tactile-optical space of representation presents a complex eye-hand relation: an ideal optical space that nonetheless maintains virtual referents to tactility (depth, contour, relief). From this, two types of subordination can occur: a subordination of the hand to the eye in optical space (Byzantine art), and a strict subordination of the eye to the hand in a manual space (Gothic art). But what Deleuze, following Riegl, terms haptic space (from the Greek verb aptõ, to touch) is a space in which there is no longer a hand-eye subordination in either direction. It implies a type of seeing distinct from the optical, a close-up viewing in which “the sense of sight behaves just like the sense of touch.”
http://www.upress.umn.edu/excerpts/Deleuze.html
+
art historian Alois Riegl (1927) on early Roman art particularly textiles. Riegl’s work has been taken up by critical theorists to explore the specificity of cinema and digital media. In Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari appropriate Riegl’s term to describe a notion of space that is contingent, close up, and short term lacking a fixed point of reference. Haptic space for Deleuze and Guattari, may be visual, tactile and auditory
+
It is not about the all-encompassing (optical) view, but the micro-level (haptic) variation, which suggests orientation and negotiation that is articulated step by step, at a local level (Rebelo).
http://spacecollective.org/Wildcat/6065/Gilles-Deleuze-Francis-Bacon-the-Logic-of-Sensation-pt-2

thacker’s shaviro’s connected review
“Reach out and touch someone? It’s the worst thing that could happen to you”.

Connected is arranged as a series of short segments, each with a title, and each running between one to three pages. There is no one theoretical or narrative thread in Connected, but many. Methodologically, Shaviro uses science fiction as a way of gaining a novel, critical understanding of our current network society.
For Shaviro, science fiction is the only social theory capable of comprehending the many reversals that new media offer.

In his discussion of Bruce Sterling’s novel, Distraction, Shaviro notes the fine line between attentive multitasking
and the McLuhanesque “cool media” of total media distraction. In a way, Connected is Shaviro’s attempt to explore
this boundary. We might even call it the “critical theory of distraction.”

http://www.leonardo.info/reviews/apr2004/connect_thacker.html

lepsia verzia v .txt: http://burundi.sk/dusan/carrythatweight/images/5/51/Pzi.esej.research.txt

premise: what if whitehead, not heidegger would set the agenda for postmodern thought?

INTRO

whitehead 861 aq 7 akbal IX – process and reality, 29
heidegger 889 li 11 cimi XI – being and time, 27
> both books = antiessentialist, antipositivist

1 q of beginnings
H’s first question of Being: “Why is there something, rather than nothing?”
W begins with “How is it that there is always something new?”
How can our culture’s incessant repetition and recycling nonetheless issue forth in something genuinely new and different?

2 q of history of phil
H: where did phil got wrong path?
W: “It is really not sufficient to direct attention to the best that has been said and done in the an-
cient world. The result is static, repressive, and promotes a decadent habit of
mind.” Instead of trying to pin down the history of philosophy, Whitehead
twists this history in wonderfully ungainly ways. He mines it for unexpected
creative sparks, excerpting those moments where, for instance, Plato affirms
Becoming against the static world of Ideas, or Descartes refutes mind–body
dualism.
^ nedebugovat linearnu historiu filozofie, ale nachadzat unexpected threads (ako 3hoursold v jpg ekologii)

3 W doesn’t talk about metaphysics

5 q of style
H: Heidegger’s contorted writing combines a height-
ened Romantic poeticism with the self-referential interrogation of linguistic
roots and meanings. It’s a style as portentous and exasperating as the myster-
ies it claims to disclose.
W’s language, to the contrary, is dry, gray,
and abstract. But in this academic, fussy, almost pedantic prose, he is contin-
ually saying the most astonishing things, reigniting the philosophic sense of
wonder at every step.

7 q of technology
H warns us against the danger of technological “enframing,” with its reduction of nature to the status of a “standing reserve.”
Heidegger ought to treat science and technology in the same way that he treats language: for language it-
self is a technology, and the essence of what is human involves technology in
just the same way as it does language
W: scientific and technical rationality is one kind of “abstraction.” This, in itself, is not anything bad.

8 q of subjectivity
Whitehead does not see the subject as an effect of
language. Rather, he sees subjectivity as embedded in the world. The subject
is an irreducible part of the universe, of the way things happen. There is noth-
ing outside of experience; and experience always happens to some subject or
other. This subject may be human, but it also may be a dog, a tree, a mush-
room, or a grain of sand. (Strictly speaking, any such entities are what White-
head calls “societies,” each composed of multitudes of “actual occasions,”
which themselves are the subjects in question.)
^ !! societies = objects composed of events(?) ??is he flat?? (flat ontology like early latour, and delanda)
+
In any case, the subject consti-
tutes itself in and through its experience; and thereupon it perishes, entering
into the “objective immortality” of being a “datum” for other experiences of
other subjects. In this way, Whitehead abolishes the ontological privileging of
human beings over all other subjectivities. This doesn’t mean, of course, that
the differences between human beings and other sorts of beings are irrelevant;
such differences remain pragmatically important in all kinds of situations, and
for all sorts of reasons. But in undoing the ontological privilege of being hu-
man, Whitehead suggests that the critique of the subject need not be so com-
pulsive a focus of philosophical inquiry.

Whitehead’s metaphysics stands outside the dualities—the subject or not, meaning
or not, humanism or not—with which recent theoretical thought has so often
burdened us.

Whitehead both exemplifies, and encourages, the virtues of speculation, fabulation, and invention.

Deleuze’s affinity with Whitehead lies, above all, in his focus on affect
and singularity, as a way of working toward a nondialectical and highly aes-
theticized mode of critique.

aim of S’s book: critical aestheticism.

W: “Beauty is a wider, and more fundamental, notion than Truth,” and even
“Beauty is . . . the one aim which by its very nature is self-justifying.”

Kant: Beauty cannot be judged according to concepts; it is a matter neither of em-
pirical fact, nor of moral obligation. This is why there is no science of the
beautiful. For Kant, aesthetics has no foundation, and it offers us no guaran-
tees. Rather, it throws all norms and values into question, or into crisis.
Beauty, Kant says, is not cognitive, not conceptual. “A judgment of
taste is not based on determinate concepts”; that is to say, the concept behind
such a judgment (if it can be called a “concept” at all) “does not allow us to
cognize and prove anything concerning the object because it is intrinsically
indeterminable and inadequte for cognition” (Kant 1987, 213). There is no
objective or scientific way to determine whether an object is beautiful, and—
if it is—to explain why.
+
beauty is not objectively there, in the world. It is not in nature; it is rather
something that we attribute to nature. An aesthetic judgment, therefore, is
one “whose determining basis cannot be other than subjective”
..Yet at the same time, beauty isn’t merely subjective.

ENDOF INTRO

http://burundi.sk/dusan/carrythatweight/index.php/DeLanda_-_New_Philosophy_of_Society

+ poznamky na papieroch vratane komentov od spekulativnych realistov

v ramci eseje o wikileaks, v ktorej som delandu nakoniec vobec nepouzil

[3, 5-6]