not

paste z: http://burundi.sk/dusan/carrythatweight/images/5/51/Pzi.esej.research.txt

(from /not)
Cyberspace is what Deleuze
and Guattari call a “haptic” space, as opposed to an optical
one: a space of “pure connection,” accessible only to “closerange
vision,” and having to be navigated “step by step. . . .
One never sees from a distance in a space of this kind, nor
does one see it from a distance”.
No panoramic
view is possible, for the space is always folding, dividing,
expanding, and contracting. [nema zmysel robit vizualne komplexne webstranky – len tolko co clovek
vie cele prijat, v pozadi socialna navigacia, takze ‘listujem’ dalej
Time is flexible on the Net as
well; things happen at different speeds. Sometimes I must
read and type extremely fast to keep up with rapid-fire chat
room conversations. Other times I have to hold myself back
as I wait for pages or files to download.
What’s more, these
multiple speeds, times, and spaces overlap. Enveloped in
the network, I am continually being distracted.
I can no
longer concentrate on just one thing at a time. My body is
pulled in several directions at once, dancing to many distinct
rhythms. My attention fragments and multiplies as I
shift among the many windows on my screen. Being online
always means multitasking.

haptic space
=
a haptic vision of color, as opposed to the optical vision of light. What Deleuze calls haptic vision is precisely this “sense” of colors. The tactile-optical space of representation presents a complex eye-hand relation: an ideal optical space that nonetheless maintains virtual referents to tactility (depth, contour, relief). From this, two types of subordination can occur: a subordination of the hand to the eye in optical space (Byzantine art), and a strict subordination of the eye to the hand in a manual space (Gothic art). But what Deleuze, following Riegl, terms haptic space (from the Greek verb aptõ, to touch) is a space in which there is no longer a hand-eye subordination in either direction. It implies a type of seeing distinct from the optical, a close-up viewing in which “the sense of sight behaves just like the sense of touch.”
http://www.upress.umn.edu/excerpts/Deleuze.html
+
art historian Alois Riegl (1927) on early Roman art particularly textiles. Riegl’s work has been taken up by critical theorists to explore the specificity of cinema and digital media. In Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari appropriate Riegl’s term to describe a notion of space that is contingent, close up, and short term lacking a fixed point of reference. Haptic space for Deleuze and Guattari, may be visual, tactile and auditory
+
It is not about the all-encompassing (optical) view, but the micro-level (haptic) variation, which suggests orientation and negotiation that is articulated step by step, at a local level (Rebelo).
http://spacecollective.org/Wildcat/6065/Gilles-Deleuze-Francis-Bacon-the-Logic-of-Sensation-pt-2

thacker’s shaviro’s connected review
“Reach out and touch someone? It’s the worst thing that could happen to you”.

Connected is arranged as a series of short segments, each with a title, and each running between one to three pages. There is no one theoretical or narrative thread in Connected, but many. Methodologically, Shaviro uses science fiction as a way of gaining a novel, critical understanding of our current network society.
For Shaviro, science fiction is the only social theory capable of comprehending the many reversals that new media offer.

In his discussion of Bruce Sterling’s novel, Distraction, Shaviro notes the fine line between attentive multitasking
and the McLuhanesque “cool media” of total media distraction. In a way, Connected is Shaviro’s attempt to explore
this boundary. We might even call it the “critical theory of distraction.”

http://www.leonardo.info/reviews/apr2004/connect_thacker.html

lepsia verzia v .txt: http://burundi.sk/dusan/carrythatweight/images/5/51/Pzi.esej.research.txt

premise: what if whitehead, not heidegger would set the agenda for postmodern thought?

INTRO

whitehead 861 aq 7 akbal IX – process and reality, 29
heidegger 889 li 11 cimi XI – being and time, 27
> both books = antiessentialist, antipositivist

1 q of beginnings
H’s first question of Being: “Why is there something, rather than nothing?”
W begins with “How is it that there is always something new?”
How can our culture’s incessant repetition and recycling nonetheless issue forth in something genuinely new and different?

2 q of history of phil
H: where did phil got wrong path?
W: “It is really not sufficient to direct attention to the best that has been said and done in the an-
cient world. The result is static, repressive, and promotes a decadent habit of
mind.” Instead of trying to pin down the history of philosophy, Whitehead
twists this history in wonderfully ungainly ways. He mines it for unexpected
creative sparks, excerpting those moments where, for instance, Plato affirms
Becoming against the static world of Ideas, or Descartes refutes mind–body
dualism.
^ nedebugovat linearnu historiu filozofie, ale nachadzat unexpected threads (ako 3hoursold v jpg ekologii)

3 W doesn’t talk about metaphysics

5 q of style
H: Heidegger’s contorted writing combines a height-
ened Romantic poeticism with the self-referential interrogation of linguistic
roots and meanings. It’s a style as portentous and exasperating as the myster-
ies it claims to disclose.
W’s language, to the contrary, is dry, gray,
and abstract. But in this academic, fussy, almost pedantic prose, he is contin-
ually saying the most astonishing things, reigniting the philosophic sense of
wonder at every step.

7 q of technology
H warns us against the danger of technological “enframing,” with its reduction of nature to the status of a “standing reserve.”
Heidegger ought to treat science and technology in the same way that he treats language: for language it-
self is a technology, and the essence of what is human involves technology in
just the same way as it does language
W: scientific and technical rationality is one kind of “abstraction.” This, in itself, is not anything bad.

8 q of subjectivity
Whitehead does not see the subject as an effect of
language. Rather, he sees subjectivity as embedded in the world. The subject
is an irreducible part of the universe, of the way things happen. There is noth-
ing outside of experience; and experience always happens to some subject or
other. This subject may be human, but it also may be a dog, a tree, a mush-
room, or a grain of sand. (Strictly speaking, any such entities are what White-
head calls “societies,” each composed of multitudes of “actual occasions,”
which themselves are the subjects in question.)
^ !! societies = objects composed of events(?) ??is he flat?? (flat ontology like early latour, and delanda)
+
In any case, the subject consti-
tutes itself in and through its experience; and thereupon it perishes, entering
into the “objective immortality” of being a “datum” for other experiences of
other subjects. In this way, Whitehead abolishes the ontological privileging of
human beings over all other subjectivities. This doesn’t mean, of course, that
the differences between human beings and other sorts of beings are irrelevant;
such differences remain pragmatically important in all kinds of situations, and
for all sorts of reasons. But in undoing the ontological privilege of being hu-
man, Whitehead suggests that the critique of the subject need not be so com-
pulsive a focus of philosophical inquiry.

Whitehead’s metaphysics stands outside the dualities—the subject or not, meaning
or not, humanism or not—with which recent theoretical thought has so often
burdened us.

Whitehead both exemplifies, and encourages, the virtues of speculation, fabulation, and invention.

Deleuze’s affinity with Whitehead lies, above all, in his focus on affect
and singularity, as a way of working toward a nondialectical and highly aes-
theticized mode of critique.

aim of S’s book: critical aestheticism.

W: “Beauty is a wider, and more fundamental, notion than Truth,” and even
“Beauty is . . . the one aim which by its very nature is self-justifying.”

Kant: Beauty cannot be judged according to concepts; it is a matter neither of em-
pirical fact, nor of moral obligation. This is why there is no science of the
beautiful. For Kant, aesthetics has no foundation, and it offers us no guaran-
tees. Rather, it throws all norms and values into question, or into crisis.
Beauty, Kant says, is not cognitive, not conceptual. “A judgment of
taste is not based on determinate concepts”; that is to say, the concept behind
such a judgment (if it can be called a “concept” at all) “does not allow us to
cognize and prove anything concerning the object because it is intrinsically
indeterminable and inadequte for cognition” (Kant 1987, 213). There is no
objective or scientific way to determine whether an object is beautiful, and—
if it is—to explain why.
+
beauty is not objectively there, in the world. It is not in nature; it is rather
something that we attribute to nature. An aesthetic judgment, therefore, is
one “whose determining basis cannot be other than subjective”
..Yet at the same time, beauty isn’t merely subjective.

ENDOF INTRO

+ research:

http://burundi.sk/dusan/carrythatweight/index.php/Tactics_of_leaking_and_politics_of_the_common

what Jane Bennett calls vital materialism: the recognition that “vitality is shared by all things,” and not limited to ourselves alone (Bennett 2010, 89).
=
non-dualistic neo-vitalism, or what Jane Bennett calls vital materialism: the idea that “every thing is entelechial, life-ly, vitalistic” (Bennett 2010, 89)
+
Graham Harman, expanding Heidegger’s concept readiness-to-hand (Zuhandenheit), calls tool-being (Harman 2002).
+
As Jane Bennett puts it, “maybe it is worth running the risks associated with anthropomorphism (superstition, the divinization of nature, romanticism) because it, oddly enough, works against anthropocentrism: a chord is struck between person and thing, and I am no longer above or outside a nonhuman ‘environment.’
= magick & xxxxx ?
+
David Skrbina has argued at great and persuasive length, panpsychism has a long history
in, and is deeply embedded within, Western thought (Skrbina 2005).
panpsychism has recently come to be entertained by thinkers of various persuasions,
including analytic philosophers like Galen Strawson (2006) and to some extent David Chalmers (1997).

GET Bennett, Jane (2010). Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things. Durham: Duke University Press.
GET Harman, Graham (2002). Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects. Chicago and LaSalle: Open Court.
GET Jones, Gwyneth (2010). The Universe of Things. Seattle: Aqueduct Press.
Shaviro, Steven (2009). Without Criteria: Kant, Whitehead, Deleuze, and Aesthetics.
Cambridge: MIT Press.
OK Skrbina, David (2005). Panpsychism in the West. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Strawson, Galen (2006). “Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism.”
In: Consciousness and Its Place in Nature: Does Physicalism Entail
Panpsychism? Ed. by Anthony Freeman. Exeter: Imprint Academic, pp. 3–31.
Whitehead, Alfred North (1925/1967). Science and the Modern World. New York:
The Free Press.
— (1929/1978). Process and Reality. New York: The Free Press.

[prolog]
00:43 < barak> tiez stale nechapem preco ma tak bavi suicide
00:44 < barak> asi ze som doteraz nic pocitovo podobne nepocul
00:55 < pht__> :) namotal si sa?
00:56 < barak> waga waga

SHAVIRO – POSTCINEMATIC AFFECT
(hudba a film hovoria o komplex social procesoch, ale nereprezuntuju ich az tak ako na nich aktivne participuju)
These works are symptomatic, in
that they provide indices of complex social processes, which they transduce,
condense and rearticulate in the form of what can be called, after Deleuze
and Guattari, ‘blocs of affect.’1 But they are also productive, in the sense
that they do not represent social processes, so much as they participate
actively in these processes, and help to constitute them.
(filmy a hudba generuju AFEKT ~ are machines for generating affect +
and for capitalising upon, or extracting value from, this affect.)
As such, they are not
ideological superstructures, as an older sort of Marxist criticism would have
it. Rather, they lie at the very heart of social production, circulation and
distribution.
(cize nie su marxisticky kritizovatelne? su proste nevyhnutne, neexistuje alternativa?)
They generate subjectivity and they play a crucial role in the
valorisation of capital.
+
1 Strictly speaking, Deleuze and Guattari say that the work of art ‘is a bloc of
sensations, that is to say, a compound of percepts and affects’ (1994, 164).

(afekt vs emotion via Massumi)
I follow Brian Massumi (2002, 23-45) in differentiating between affect and
emotion.
For Massumi, affect is primary, non-conscious, asubjective or
presubjective, asignifying, unqualified and intensive; while emotion is
derivative, conscious, qualified and meaningful, a ‘content’ that can be
attributed to an already-constituted subject.
[naozaj si hudbu pustam ako stimul pre vytvaranie pocitov,
vnimam ju v ramci multitaskingu, paralelne,
zaroven nad nom aj rozmyslam, cize okrem pasivneho prijimania afektov
syntetizujem pocity viazuce sa k nej ale aj k ostatnym veciam ktore robim]
[TYMITO POCITMI PRAVE HOVORIT O HUDBE –
je ale kazdy album vzdy dobry na uzky okruh pocitov?
alebo si dokazete pri rovnakej hudbe v roznom case syntetizovat rozne pocity?]
Emotion is affect captured by a
subject, or tamed and reduced to the extent that it becomes commensurate
with that subject. Subjects are overwhelmed and traversed by affect, but
they have or possess their own emotions.

re: Beller (stavia na nom, ale beller podcenuje rozdiel medzi cinematic a postcinematic,
co teda rozvija Shaviro)
However, I
think that he underestimates the differences between cinematic and post-cinematic
media: it is these differences that drive my own discussion here.

(subjekt = ekon.jednotka, ktora je sama pre seba kapitalom, producentom aj zdrojom prijmov=
“mal by som viac pracovat a zarobit lebo mam malo prachov”=zdroj prijmov
“potrebujem si spravit toto a tamto, v ramci vlastnej vyroby na vlastnu ‘zakazku'”=producent
“moj kapital su moje schopnosti, osobnost, profil”)
[uz par tyzdnov mam pocit ze sam seba exploitujem, ked chcem nieco dokoncit a podobne]
@neolib capitalism we see ourselves as subjects precisely to the extent that we are
autonomous economic units. As Foucault puts it, neoliberalism defines a new
mutation of ‘Homo oeconomicus as entrepreneur of himself, being for
himself his own capital, being for himself his own producer, being for himself
the source of [his] earnings’ (2008, 226).
(tomuto ale nerozumiem: )
For such a subject, emotions are
resources to invest, in the hope of gaining as large a return as possible. What
we know today as ‘affective labour’ is not really affective at all, as it
involves rather the sale of labour-power in the form of pre-defined and prepackaged
emotions.3
3 (nesuhlasi s Hardt+Negrim v tom ze):
For Hardt and Negri, ‘unlike emotions, which are mental phenomena, affects refer
equally to body and to mind. In fact, affects, such as joy and sadness, reveal the
present state of life in the entire organism’ (2004, 108)
(lebo):
(wrong) because there is no such thing as ‘mental phenomena’ that do not refer
equally to the body. The division between affect and emotion must rather be
sought elsewhere.
(preferuje massumiho definiciu pocitu)
emotion as the capture, and reduction-to-commensurability, of affect.
It is this reduction that,
among other things, allows for the sale and purchase of emotions as commodities.
(inak to je asi fakt pravda, tiez sa priklanam k massumovi)
(toto prirovnanie je divne):
In a certain sense, emotion is to affect as, in Marxist theory, labour-power is to
labour. For labour itself is an unqualifiable capacity, while labour-power is a
quantifiable commodity that is possessed, and that can be sold, by the worker.
(affective labour – @hardt+negri: sluzby produkujuce emocie, @shaviro: su tie sluzby
uz objektifikovane emocie):
Hardt and Negri’s own definition of affective labour in fact itself makes sense
precisely in the register of what I am calling labour-power and objectified emotions:
‘Affective labor, then, is labor that produces or manipulates affects such as a feeling
of ease, well-being, satisfaction, excitement, or passion. One can recognize affective
labor, for example, in the work of legal assistants, flight attendants, and fast food
workers (service with a smile)’ (108).

[tanecna hudba je velmi o emociach, idem do klubu a chcem sa zextatnit]

However, emotion as such is never closed or complete. It also still
testifies to the affect out of which it is formed, and that it has captured,
reduced and repressed. Behind every emotion, there is always a certain
surplus of affect that ‘escapes confinement’ and ‘remains unactualised,
inseparable from but unassimilable to any particular, functionally anchored
perspective’ (Massumi 2002, 35).
(teda ze pocit sa vzdy nadalej viaze k povodnemu afektu z ktoreho som ho
syntetizoval; pretoze tam stale ostava otvorene co z neho mozem dalsie
syntetizovat)
Privatised emotion can never entirely
separate itself from the affect from which it is derived. Emotion is
representable and representative; but it also points beyond itself to an affect
that works transpersonally and transversally, that is at once singular and
common (Hardt and Negri 2004, 128-129),
(tym ze je pocit zosobneny, tak sa vzdy viaze k afektu — ten je
transpersonalny a transversalny ——– ???? asi ze osobny a zaroven
spolocny–napriklad afekt produkujuci videom lady gaga)
and that is irreducible to any sort of representation.
Our existence is always bound up with affective and
aesthetic flows that elude cognitive definition or capture.
(ano, z afektov mozeme stale syntetizovat nove pocity,
ktore su este nesyntetizovane)4
4 (monoskop!!):
Fascism and Nazism in particular are
noteworthy for their mobilisation of cinematic affect; though arguably Soviet
communism and liberal capitalism also mobilized such affect in their own ways.

(@postmod nezmizol afekt ako tvrdi jameson, ale subjektivne pocity sa vytratili)
On the basis of his distinction between affect and emotion, Massumi
rejects Fredric Jameson’s famous claim about the ‘waning of affect’ in
postmodern culture (Jameson 1991, 10-12). For Massumi, it is precisely
subjective emotion that has waned, but not affect.

5 (anti-oedipus sa snazil spojit nekritizovatelnost afektu[massumi zastanca–ked kritizuje
jamesona napr..: ‘affect is not ownable or recognisable and is thus resistant to critique’]
a marxistickou teoriou, ktore su inak vacsinou stavane ostro proti sebe oboma tabormi):
Affect theory, or ‘non-representational theory’ (Thrift 2008), is usually placed in
sharp opposition to Marxist theory, by advocates of both approaches. I am
arguing, instead, that we need to draw them together. This is precisely what
Deleuze and Guattari attempted to do in Anti-Oedipus (1983). The attempt was
not entirely successful, but it seems prescient in the light of subsequent ‘neoliberal’
developments in both affective and political economies.
(via latour: sietove socialne procesy sa nedaju vysvetlit kategoriami ‘capital’ alebo
‘social’ lebo prave tie potrebujeme vysvetlit, co ale zaroven neznamena ze su
nepouzitelne, iba ze ich potrebujeme skonstruovat resp samokonstruovat znovu,
k comu upada latour v nepozornych momentoch)
I am largely sympathetic to Bruno Latour’s
insistence that networked social processes cannot be explained in terms of global
categories like ‘capital,’ or ‘the social’ – because these categories themselves are what
most urgently need to be explained.

Affect and
labour are two attributes of the same Spinozian substance; they are both
powers or potentials of the human body, expressions of its ‘vitality,’ ‘sense of
aliveness,’ and ‘changeability’ (Massumi 2002, 36).

(mapa:)
aesthetic of affective mapping.6 For Jameson and Deleuze and
Guattari alike, maps are not static representations, but tools for negotiating,
and intervening in, social space. A map does not just replicate the shape of a
territory; rather, it actively inflects and works over that territory.

[page 7]

…..(poznamky v printoute)
[7-24]

[25]

zaujimave, rozvit nejakym projektom:
Cyberspace is what Deleuze
and Guattari call a “haptic” space, as opposed to an optical
one: a space of “pure connection,” accessible only to “closerange
vision,” and having to be navigated “step by step. . . .
One never sees from a distance in a space of this kind, nor
does one see it from a distance”.
No panoramic
view is possible, for the space is always folding, dividing,
expanding, and contracting. [nema zmysel robit vizualne komplexne webstranky – len tolko co clovek
vie cele prijat, v pozadi socialna navigacia, takze ‘listujem’ dalej
Time is flexible on the Net as
well; things happen at different speeds. Sometimes I must
read and type extremely fast to keep up with rapid-fire chat
room conversations. Other times I have to hold myself back
as I wait for pages or files to download.
What’s more, these
multiple speeds, times, and spaces overlap. Enveloped in
the network, I am continually being distracted.
I can no
longer concentrate on just one thing at a time. My body is
pulled in several directions at once, dancing to many distinct
rhythms. My attention fragments and multiplies as I
shift among the many windows on my screen. Being online
always means multitasking.