[prolog]
00:43 < barak> tiez stale nechapem preco ma tak bavi suicide
00:44 < barak> asi ze som doteraz nic pocitovo podobne nepocul
00:55 < pht__> :) namotal si sa?
00:56 < barak> waga waga
SHAVIRO – POSTCINEMATIC AFFECT
(hudba a film hovoria o komplex social procesoch, ale nereprezuntuju ich az tak ako na nich aktivne participuju)
These works are symptomatic, in
that they provide indices of complex social processes, which they transduce,
condense and rearticulate in the form of what can be called, after Deleuze
and Guattari, ‘blocs of affect.’1 But they are also productive, in the sense
that they do not represent social processes, so much as they participate
actively in these processes, and help to constitute them.
(filmy a hudba generuju AFEKT ~ are machines for generating affect +
and for capitalising upon, or extracting value from, this affect.)
As such, they are not
ideological superstructures, as an older sort of Marxist criticism would have
it. Rather, they lie at the very heart of social production, circulation and
distribution.
(cize nie su marxisticky kritizovatelne? su proste nevyhnutne, neexistuje alternativa?)
They generate subjectivity and they play a crucial role in the
valorisation of capital.
+
1 Strictly speaking, Deleuze and Guattari say that the work of art ‘is a bloc of
sensations, that is to say, a compound of percepts and affects’ (1994, 164).
(afekt vs emotion via Massumi)
I follow Brian Massumi (2002, 23-45) in differentiating between affect and
emotion.
For Massumi, affect is primary, non-conscious, asubjective or
presubjective, asignifying, unqualified and intensive; while emotion is
derivative, conscious, qualified and meaningful, a ‘content’ that can be
attributed to an already-constituted subject.
[naozaj si hudbu pustam ako stimul pre vytvaranie pocitov,
vnimam ju v ramci multitaskingu, paralelne,
zaroven nad nom aj rozmyslam, cize okrem pasivneho prijimania afektov
syntetizujem pocity viazuce sa k nej ale aj k ostatnym veciam ktore robim]
[TYMITO POCITMI PRAVE HOVORIT O HUDBE –
je ale kazdy album vzdy dobry na uzky okruh pocitov?
alebo si dokazete pri rovnakej hudbe v roznom case syntetizovat rozne pocity?]
Emotion is affect captured by a
subject, or tamed and reduced to the extent that it becomes commensurate
with that subject. Subjects are overwhelmed and traversed by affect, but
they have or possess their own emotions.
re: Beller (stavia na nom, ale beller podcenuje rozdiel medzi cinematic a postcinematic,
co teda rozvija Shaviro)
However, I
think that he underestimates the differences between cinematic and post-cinematic
media: it is these differences that drive my own discussion here.
(subjekt = ekon.jednotka, ktora je sama pre seba kapitalom, producentom aj zdrojom prijmov=
“mal by som viac pracovat a zarobit lebo mam malo prachov”=zdroj prijmov
“potrebujem si spravit toto a tamto, v ramci vlastnej vyroby na vlastnu ‘zakazku'”=producent
“moj kapital su moje schopnosti, osobnost, profil”)
[uz par tyzdnov mam pocit ze sam seba exploitujem, ked chcem nieco dokoncit a podobne]
@neolib capitalism we see ourselves as subjects precisely to the extent that we are
autonomous economic units. As Foucault puts it, neoliberalism defines a new
mutation of ‘Homo oeconomicus as entrepreneur of himself, being for
himself his own capital, being for himself his own producer, being for himself
the source of [his] earnings’ (2008, 226).
(tomuto ale nerozumiem: )
For such a subject, emotions are
resources to invest, in the hope of gaining as large a return as possible. What
we know today as ‘affective labour’ is not really affective at all, as it
involves rather the sale of labour-power in the form of pre-defined and prepackaged
emotions.3
3 (nesuhlasi s Hardt+Negrim v tom ze):
For Hardt and Negri, ‘unlike emotions, which are mental phenomena, affects refer
equally to body and to mind. In fact, affects, such as joy and sadness, reveal the
present state of life in the entire organism’ (2004, 108)
(lebo):
(wrong) because there is no such thing as ‘mental phenomena’ that do not refer
equally to the body. The division between affect and emotion must rather be
sought elsewhere.
(preferuje massumiho definiciu pocitu)
emotion as the capture, and reduction-to-commensurability, of affect.
It is this reduction that,
among other things, allows for the sale and purchase of emotions as commodities.
(inak to je asi fakt pravda, tiez sa priklanam k massumovi)
(toto prirovnanie je divne):
In a certain sense, emotion is to affect as, in Marxist theory, labour-power is to
labour. For labour itself is an unqualifiable capacity, while labour-power is a
quantifiable commodity that is possessed, and that can be sold, by the worker.
(affective labour – @hardt+negri: sluzby produkujuce emocie, @shaviro: su tie sluzby
uz objektifikovane emocie):
Hardt and Negri’s own definition of affective labour in fact itself makes sense
precisely in the register of what I am calling labour-power and objectified emotions:
‘Affective labor, then, is labor that produces or manipulates affects such as a feeling
of ease, well-being, satisfaction, excitement, or passion. One can recognize affective
labor, for example, in the work of legal assistants, flight attendants, and fast food
workers (service with a smile)’ (108).
[tanecna hudba je velmi o emociach, idem do klubu a chcem sa zextatnit]
However, emotion as such is never closed or complete. It also still
testifies to the affect out of which it is formed, and that it has captured,
reduced and repressed. Behind every emotion, there is always a certain
surplus of affect that ‘escapes confinement’ and ‘remains unactualised,
inseparable from but unassimilable to any particular, functionally anchored
perspective’ (Massumi 2002, 35).
(teda ze pocit sa vzdy nadalej viaze k povodnemu afektu z ktoreho som ho
syntetizoval; pretoze tam stale ostava otvorene co z neho mozem dalsie
syntetizovat)
Privatised emotion can never entirely
separate itself from the affect from which it is derived. Emotion is
representable and representative; but it also points beyond itself to an affect
that works transpersonally and transversally, that is at once singular and
common (Hardt and Negri 2004, 128-129),
(tym ze je pocit zosobneny, tak sa vzdy viaze k afektu — ten je
transpersonalny a transversalny ——– ???? asi ze osobny a zaroven
spolocny–napriklad afekt produkujuci videom lady gaga)
and that is irreducible to any sort of representation.
Our existence is always bound up with affective and
aesthetic flows that elude cognitive definition or capture.
(ano, z afektov mozeme stale syntetizovat nove pocity,
ktore su este nesyntetizovane)4
4 (monoskop!!):
Fascism and Nazism in particular are
noteworthy for their mobilisation of cinematic affect; though arguably Soviet
communism and liberal capitalism also mobilized such affect in their own ways.
(@postmod nezmizol afekt ako tvrdi jameson, ale subjektivne pocity sa vytratili)
On the basis of his distinction between affect and emotion, Massumi
rejects Fredric Jameson’s famous claim about the ‘waning of affect’ in
postmodern culture (Jameson 1991, 10-12). For Massumi, it is precisely
subjective emotion that has waned, but not affect.
5 (anti-oedipus sa snazil spojit nekritizovatelnost afektu[massumi zastanca–ked kritizuje
jamesona napr..: ‘affect is not ownable or recognisable and is thus resistant to critique’]
a marxistickou teoriou, ktore su inak vacsinou stavane ostro proti sebe oboma tabormi):
Affect theory, or ‘non-representational theory’ (Thrift 2008), is usually placed in
sharp opposition to Marxist theory, by advocates of both approaches. I am
arguing, instead, that we need to draw them together. This is precisely what
Deleuze and Guattari attempted to do in Anti-Oedipus (1983). The attempt was
not entirely successful, but it seems prescient in the light of subsequent ‘neoliberal’
developments in both affective and political economies.
(via latour: sietove socialne procesy sa nedaju vysvetlit kategoriami ‘capital’ alebo
‘social’ lebo prave tie potrebujeme vysvetlit, co ale zaroven neznamena ze su
nepouzitelne, iba ze ich potrebujeme skonstruovat resp samokonstruovat znovu,
k comu upada latour v nepozornych momentoch)
I am largely sympathetic to Bruno Latour’s
insistence that networked social processes cannot be explained in terms of global
categories like ‘capital,’ or ‘the social’ – because these categories themselves are what
most urgently need to be explained.
Affect and
labour are two attributes of the same Spinozian substance; they are both
powers or potentials of the human body, expressions of its ‘vitality,’ ‘sense of
aliveness,’ and ‘changeability’ (Massumi 2002, 36).
(mapa:)
aesthetic of affective mapping.6 For Jameson and Deleuze and
Guattari alike, maps are not static representations, but tools for negotiating,
and intervening in, social space. A map does not just replicate the shape of a
territory; rather, it actively inflects and works over that territory.
[page 7]
…..(poznamky v printoute)
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